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Abstract 
Purpose: To investigate the impact of trust, prior relationship duration, purchase volume, 
asymmetric buyer transaction-specific investment and buyer dependence on supplier 
opportunism in the tour operator–accommodation establishment’s dyadic relationship. 
Design/methodology/approach: A list of licenced tour operators from the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism constituted the sampling frame. The repondents answered 
all questions with regard to one of their most important suppliers. A total of 81 responses 
were collected. Moderated multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses. 
Findings: Trust dissipates supplier opportunism. Moreover, the effect of buyer 
dependence on supplier opportunism is non-monotonic over the range of relationship 
duration. Meanwhile, the effect of asymmetric buyer transaction-specific investment on 
supplier opportunism moves in a non-monotonic fashion over the range of purchase 
volume. 
Research limitations/implications: Relatively small sample size, only 81 responses, may 
impair generalizability of the findings. Furthermore this study is grounded on a cross-
sectional design, which does not account for relationship dynamics. Future studies could 
embrace longitudinal design to overcome such barrier. 
Theoretical implications: Asymmetrical dependence and transaction-specific investment 
in a buyer-seller relationship tend to exacerbate opportunistic exploitation by the less 
dependent counterpart. When the buyer’s bargaining power is high, the positive 
association of asymmetric buyer transaction-specific investment and supplier opportunism 
significantly weakens. A well established buyer-seller relationship significantly dissipates 
the positive association of asymmetric buyer dependence and supplier opportunism. 
Managerial implications: Opportunism presents a real threat in the business context. 
However little seems to be kown to the management. This study has clearly delineated 
antecedents to opportunism. Opportunistic behavior perpetrates channel conflicts, distrust 
and premature termination of inter-firm relationship. It is therefore imperative for business 
partners to keep an eye out for each other in order to promote a win-win situation. 
Key words: Supplier opportunism; Asymmetric dependence; Trust; Relationship duration; 
Asymmetric transaction-specific investment; Tourism industry; Tour operator; 
Accommodation establishment; Tanzania; Transaction cost analysis; Resource dependence 
theory; Relational contracting theory. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background Information 
The growth in travel and tourism industry can be traced back as far as 1978 when the 
United States of America deregulated its airline industry (Kazda and Caves 2000). This 
deregulation revolutionized the development of the travel and tourism industry which 
enhanced mobility and influx of tourists in destinations of interest. As the need for travel 
increased so did the market for tourism product which resulted into an increase in 
economic and social benefits ensuing from spending in the destination countries. As 
Youell (1998) points out, tourism receipts in 1994 overtook both crude petroleum and 
motor vehicle to become the world’s number one export earner. Today earning from world 
tourism industry amounts to US$ 7.6 trillion, meanwhile its contribution to world GDP 
grew by 9.8% as of 2014 (WTTC, 2015) supporting nearly 277 million people in 
employment globally. This is in line with what Youell (1998) termed as multiplier effect of 
tourism, meaning that income earned from tourism activities is circulated in the local 
economy hence boosting its overal income. 
As Welford, Ytterhus and Eligh (1999) point out, tourism industry is an important source 
of income for many countries. Thus Tanzania’s tourism industry is not an exception to the 
foregoing benefits; as Tanzania is one of the least developed countries (LDCs) it regards 
tourism as an important economic growth driver because of its enormous contributions in 
the areas of foreign exchange earnings, overall state revenue and improving social welfare 
of people in the destination areas (Dieke, 2003). However, Goodwin (2006) notes that, the 
net foreign exchange earnings from this industry are far less than the gross receipts. 
Notwithstanding active involvement of governments in formulating policies and strategies 
to enhance their tourism sectors, there has been a significant leaching of earnings which 
emanates from repatriation of revenues, wages and imports leaving the third-world 
destinations with a meagre return from the exploitation of their natural resources. As the 
result, efforts directed towards the attainment of environmental sustainability and 
economic growth, are barred (Yilmaz and Bititci, 2006). 
Tanzania’s tourism industry is made up of many intermediaries whom together form 
tourism industry’s value chain (see Figure 2.2). The channel intermediaries span from tour 
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operators, travel agents, accommodation establishments (i.e. hotels and lodges), catering, 
handicrafts traders, retailing and other related industries (Youell, 1998). Despite these 
intermediaries being distinct organizations they do not exist in isolation. Each one of them 
plays a catalytic role in enhancing tourists’ experience. That is, there is a mutual 
interdependence among the different actors in the value chain as some are buyers of 
tourism services and products while others are sellers of the same. However in an ever-
changing business environment the intermediaries strive to do whatever it takes to thrive. 
Coupled with different business orientations, missions and resource endowment, the 
intermediaries may resort to act in ways that are consistent with self-interest seeking with 
guile (Williamson 1985). 
To deal with this problem organizations are moving away from adversarial relations 
embedded in discrete transactions to relational transactions (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987) 
that are governed by relational norms and shared values (Macneil 1980). Notwithstanding 
the fact that organizations are not self-sufficient in resources they endow (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Emerson, 1962), they depend on other organizations for input they need to 
survive. Resource dependence of one organization on another gives rise to power (Bucklin 
and Sengupta, 1993) and may result into lock-in situation that enhances moral hazard 
where a weaker party stands a chance of being taken advantage of (Williamson, 1975). 
Depending on the nature of transaction and circumstances surrounding each exchange 
there may be an inclination of the trading partners to put their interests first at the expense 
of their counterparts (Williamson 1985). Furthermore, unilateral investment creates 
dependence trap and encourages expropriation of quasi-rent at the expense of focal 
investor (Rokkan, Heide and Wathne, 2003). 
However RCT informs that, as relationship grows and exchange partners get to know each 
other better, trust and rapport build up. More and more successful contacts foster relational 
norms and shared values between exchange partners. The norms therefore act as a cushion 
that serves to attenuate opportunism in an exchange relationship because they emerge to 
govern the way transactions are conducted (Dwyer et al., 1987; Joshi, 1998; Heide and 
John, 1992). 
Thus this thesis sets about investigating the dyadic relationship between tour operators and 
accommodation establishments by converging TCA, RCT, and RDT. The central theme of 
this study is set forth in the subsection below. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
This thesis is concerned with the study of supplier opportunism which is characterized by 
behaviors such as deceit, avoidance of responsibilities, haggling and false promises against 
the tour operators who are the buyers of accommodation services in the Tanzania’s tourism 
industry. These behaviors are a reflection of exchange hazard (opportunism) as noted by 
(Rindfleisch et al., 2010; Park and Ungson, 2001; John, 1984; Williamson, 1985). 
The concept of buyer-seller relationship is vastly explored in the marketing literature 
(Dwyer et al., 1987; Wang et al., 2013; Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000; Rokkan et al., 2003; 
Buvik and Reve, 2002; Buvik and Haugland, 2005). Extant literature informs that buyer-
seller relationships entail considerable exchange hazards (Wang et al., 2013; Park and 
Ungson, 2001). One of the exchange risks occurs when an exchange partner chooses to 
pursue their own interest at the expense of their counterpart in an exchange relationship 
because of differing business motives and priorities. This behavior of self-interest seeking 
with guile is what the extant literature refers to as opportunism (Williamson, 1975: 1985; 
Wathne and Heide, 2000; Rindfleisch et al., 2010). Opportunism assumes different forms 
such as adverse selection, passive opportunism and active opportunism (Wathne and 
Heide, 2000), and is potent of degrading exchange performance (Crosno and Dahalstrom, 
2008). As Parkhe (1993) and Pilling, Lawrence and Donald (1994) point out, opportunistic 
behavior between value chain members may result into a premature termination of 
relationship or at least suboptimal ralationship outcomes. 
In light of the potential exchange hazards that are embedded in buyer-seller relationships, 
this study sets about examining the antecedents to opportunism by specifically focusing 
attention on a dyadic buyer-seller relationship between tour operators and accommodation 
establishments in the Tanzania’s tourism industry. We confront and assess the interplay 
among the three theoretical paradigms TCA, RDT, and RCT in an effort to understand the 
antecedents of accommodation establishments’ opportunism vis-a-vis the tour operators. 
Therefore this study seeks to address the following research questions: 
 What factors influence opportunistic behavior of accommodation establishments as 
perceived by the tour operators? 
 What factors deter accommodation establishment’s opportunistic behavior towards 
the tour operators? 
  
4 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
Primarily this study seeks to examine buyer-seller relationships in the service industry. In 
particular the relationship between tour operators and accommodation establishments 
forms the unit of analysis in this study. Thus the specific objectives are: 
(a) to examine the role interpersonal and interorganizational trust play on opportunism 
in the tour operator-accommodation establishment relationship; 
(b) to examine the moderating effect of relationship duration on the association 
between tour operators’ dependence and accommodation establishments’ 
opportunism; and 
(c) to examine the moderating effect of volume of purchase on the association between 
tour operators’ unilateral specific investment and accommodation establishments’ 
opportunism. 
1.4 Justification for the Study 
Tourism is one of the major sectors that contribute to poverty alleviation in Tanzania 
(WTO, 2004) especially in rural areas where three-quarters of its population is found 
(Zoss, 2009). As UNCTAD (2008) pointed out, tourism industry has the potential for 
significant direct and indirect employment effects. Moreover, UNCTAD (2008) revealed 
that tourism requires about 44% of its inputs from other sectors such as transport and 
agriculture. This means that, tourism has the potential for creating more direct and indirect 
jobs and consequently contribute to the development of other economic activities in the 
country through income multiplier effect (Youell, 1998), thus boosting the overall 
economy of Tanzania. Nonetheless tourism industry is relatively labor-intensive –typical 
of service industry, thus investments in tourism tend to generate a larger and more rapid 
increase in employment than equal investment in other economic activities (Jamieson, 
Goodwin and Edmunds, 2004). 
Amid the ever-growing number of international travellers, different organizations in 
destinations need to rearange their business goals and priorities so as to enhance visitors’ 
experience. Additionally value creation in the eye of travellers cannot possibly be achieved 
by organizations working in isolation. It is the interactions of different firms such as travel 
agents, tour operators, accommodation establishments, government authorities among 
others, that when put together enhance value creation. With an ever-growing tourism 
industry, new firms are expected to emerge and so are new relationships, warranting the 
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need to study inter-firm relationships. Nonetheless, buyer-seller relationships have not 
been sufficiently explored in the service industry (Ng, 2007) as is the case in the 
manufacturing industry the fact that invoked our interest in this study. 
1.5 Scope and Delimitation of the Study 
Tourism value chain in Tanzania consists of a number of actors spanning from 
entertainment, transport such as air lines and travel agents, accommodation such as hotels 
and lodges, tour operating companies, retail stores and catering and beverage. 
Notwithstanding this diversity, this study primarily focuses on the dyadic buyer-seller 
relationship between tour operating companies and accommodation establishments in the 
tourism value chain. In this light this study extends transaction cost theory, relational 
contracting theory, and dependence theory in the tourism industry. 
Due to limited time and financial resources this study covered a sample of tour operators 
drawn from only two regions out of the twenty-five regions in Tanzania. These are: Dar Es 
Salaam and Arusha. These regions were chosen on merit, as they represent high 
concentrations of tour operators and accommodation establishments. Nonetheless these 
regions boast a lot of natural resources both flora and fauna which form major tourist 
attractions. 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
This study consists of nine chapters. Chapter one presents a brief introduction and 
background to Tanzania’s tourism industry. The chapter goes on to describing the research 
problem and relevance of this study. Chapter two presents tourism industry’s current 
trends, service characteristics and relevance of Tanzania as a research setting. Chapter 
three presents a theoretical framework and a thorough review of relevant theories partinent 
to this study. These theories will then be used to develop conceptual framework for this 
study in chapter four. Chapter four presents the conceptual model. In this chapter 
hypotheses are developed and argued for in light of TCA, RCT and RDT. Chapter five 
describes research design and the methodology adapted in this study. Chapter six presents 
definitions and operationalization of variables. Chapter seven presents measurements 
assessment and data validation where screening, validity and reliability tests are carried 
out. Chapter eight presents regression model and tests of hypotheses in this study. Finally 
chapter nine presents summary of findings and discussions. Nonetheless, limitation and 
implications are also presented including recommendations for future directions. 
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1.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented the background to the study followed by the research problem, 
objectives, justification, scope and an outline of the study. The research gap is based on 
limited contribution of TCA studies in service industry particularly in the context of 
developing world. The next chapter presents an overview of the tourism industry in 
Tanzania. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TOURISM INDUSTRY IN TANZANIA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a brief overview of the overall trends in the world tourism industry; 
it also sheds light on the current trends in the Tanzania’s tourism industry. Insights about 
tour operators and accommodation establishments are also highlighted. The chapter also 
presents tourism industry’s service characteristics as well as industry’s value chain. The 
chapter culminates by discussing the relevance of Tanzania as the research setting. 
2.2 Tourism Industry’s Overview 
According to the UNWTO (2013)’s report, the world tourism industry’s growth surpassed 
its projected 5% growth, with 52 million more tourists crossing international borders 
despite the shaky global and geopolitical crises, thus outstripping other major economic 
sectors like mining and crude oil. Tourism is deemed the single largest and most dynamic 
industry in the world economically and environmentally. 
The ripple effect of the growth in the world tourism industry is felt in the Tanzania’s 
tourism industry as well. Tanzania once known as a sleeping giant in tourism surpassed the 
1 million visitors mark in 2013 beating the ever-dominant neighboring Kenya, earning an 
estimated record of US$ 1.85 billion (MNRT, 2013). Refer to Figure 2.1 below which 
demonstrates tourism trends in Tanzania in terms of its overall contribution to the 
country’s GDP from foreign earnings for the past seven years. 
Figure 2.1 Foreign Earnings Contribution to GDP from Tourism Industry 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration based on data from MNRT (2013) 
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Endowed with natural beauty, Tanzania is the haven of tourism, benefitting the country in 
many aspects. The country encompasses some 945,234 square kilometres of which 25% of 
the total surface area hosts the vast riches of wildlife national parks and game protected 
areas, 15 National Parks, 1 conservation area –Ngorongoro Conservation Area, 28 game 
reserves and 44 game controlled areas, Mt. Kilimanjaro and the majestic spice islands of 
Zanzibar, historic and scenic sites of never-ending wonders of the world (MNRT, 2013). 
These resources have put the tourism sector in the country on its feet, which significantly 
contributes to the GDP through foreign exchange earnings surpassing gold as the main 
contributor to Tanzania’s GDP (Daily News, 2014). 
Nonetheless the travel and tourism sector has contributed to direct employments of over 
402,500 people, which is a total of 3.8% of total employment for Tanzania with a 
projection of 500,000 by the year 2024 (WTTC, 2015) making both direct and indirect 
jobs reaching a total of 1,196,000 representing 11.2% of the total employment (WTTC, 
2015). The key players of the industry include tour operators, who play a significant role in 
linking tourists to destinations, travel agents, tourism associations, for instance TATO and 
HAT, accommodation establishment companies, retail traders and also the government 
acting as the tourism administrator, making the sector a perfect competition in nature 
considering ease of entry and number of players. Figure 2.2 below demonstrates major and 
auxiliary actors the industry’s value chain. 
Figure 2.2 Tanzania’s Tourism Industry Value Chain 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration based on literature review 
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As portrayed in Figure 2.2, value creation takes place from the actors involved in the 
physical distribution such as regional carriers and travel agents, through to immigration, 
tour operators, local air and ground transport, accommodation establishments and finally, 
where travelers expend at their own discretion on souvenirs further down the chain before 
they exit the country. Tourism administrators and government agencies play part in 
collecting taxes and ensuring a level playing field for the actors in the supply chain. These 
actors put together, enhance tourists’ experience. 
2.2.1 Tour Operators 
Youell (1998) describes tour operators as intermediaries in the tourism value chain who 
buy in bulk from suppliers of tourism services and products and then break the bulk into 
small, manageable packages that are then offered for sale to prospective tourists. Thus, the 
tour operators bridge the gap in the value system by bringing together producers and 
consumers of tourism products and services (Moutinho 2000), refer to Figure 2.2 above. 
Nonetheless, the tour operators act as a linking pin in the value system by arranging for 
transfers to and from the airport, preparing tour itineraries, setting up accommodation 
bookings and game safaris and they also own their own vehicles, though there is a good 
segment that do not own their own cars but rather hire the transport from car rentals. In as 
far as everything is prearranged for the visitors, they invariably observe rather than 
experience the true foreignness of their destination (Van Der Merwe, 2003).  
Some of the giant tour operators in Tanzania include: Leopard Tours, Ranger Safaris, 
Abercrombie & Kent, and Mount Kilimanjaro Safari Club among others. Tour operators in 
Tanzania fall under private sector and majority of companies are family owned, however 
there is also a large portion of foreign-owned companies. Majority of tour companies are a 
member of TATO, however other associations such as TUTSO, ZATO and KIATO also 
exist. 
2.2.2 Tour Operators’ Services 
The tour operators are most often than not mistaken for travel agents. However the two 
intermediaries differ from each other in terms of the range of services they cater for in 
their respective positions in the value chain. Distinctively, tour operators are wholesalers 
in the tourism distribution channel whereas travel agents serve as travel retailers. At retail 
level travel agents offer a wide range of services and products including; foreign package 
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tours, car hire, visa and passport applications, flight-only sale, theatre bookings, rail 
tickets, coach holidays and tickets and travel insurance (Youell, 1998). 
Moutinho (2000), further points out that, tour operators’ ability to combine travel products 
and offer them to prospective customers at comparably lower prices than what would 
normally be available to individuals, provides travel economy and convenience to a 
significant segment of tourists. For all practical purposes tour operators provide a wide 
range of services to both business and leisure segments of tourists. 
Meanwhile the former concerns tourists who travel on business for instance attending trade 
fairs, exhibitions, meetings, conferences or incentive travel, the latter segment concerns 
travelling for leisure such as taking a holiday at home or abroad, or travelling for health 
and fitness, sports, culture and religion (Youell, 1998). The tour operators are well equiped 
to cater for the needs of these segments by tailoring products and services they offer to the 
needs of their varied customer groups. For instance a schedule for travelers on business
1
 
meeting could be: arranging for their transport to and from hotel, and also fixing in game 
tour before the travelers depart the country. On the other hand the schedule for leisure 
travellers
2
 is much detailed as stipulated in the itenerary as these are in no hurry. 
Moreover, as the tour operators take clients on tours they come in contact with them thus 
developing good rapport with them. Besides the tour operators hire either permanent or 
freelancing, tour guides who are well trained and versed in the industry in order to enhance 
the tourists’ experience. The tour guides, guide the tourists through the country while 
showing them around; meanwhile the tourists receive plenty of information about the 
country’s history and current social-political situation. 
The tour guides play a catalytic role in enhancing tourists’ experience as they can speak 
different languages and so can they adapt to the language of a particular group of tourists 
thus enhancing better communication. Nonetheless, the guides are knowledgeable about 
safety procedures and precautions in whether the visitors are in transfers, town tours or 
game tours. As Van Der Merwe (2003) puts it, because everything is pre-arranged for the 
tourists, it is a healthy alternative to their venturing alone in a country. 
                                                 
1
 Business and professionals travelers account for 6% of share of international arrivals in Tanzania (MNRT 
2013) 
2
 Leisure travelers account for 81% of share of international arrivals in Tanzania (MNRT 2013) 
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2.2.3 Tour Operators Relationship with Accommodation Establishments 
This part forms the main subject of this study. Tour operators and accommodation 
establishments have the potential of forging mutually beneficial relationships with each 
other. In Tanzania, the tour operators mostly do business with game lodges, hotels, 
campsites, farms, motels, guest houses and hostels. Despite these numerous 
categorizations of accommodation establishments, it appeared that tour operators in 
Tanzania seem to trade more with lodges, hotels and camps than with the rest of the other 
categorizations. However this study does not focus attention on any particular 
categorization of these establishments other than for the identfication of most important 
supplier of accommodation services a particular tour operator trades with. As tour 
operators make regular bookings with accommodation establishments for current tours as 
well as tours that will take place in the future, they develop buyer-seller relationship in 
time. 
As accommodation establishments are located in strategic tourist resorts, this proximity 
advantage gives them an upper hand against small tour operators who are comparably 
weaker in terms of bargaining power. Dependence issues may also arise and perpetrate 
opportunistic exploitation on the part of accommodation establishments. However, in order 
to enhance a win-win situation tour operators and accommodation establishments need to 
look out for each other. 
2.3 Tourism Industry’s Service Characteristics 
2.3.1 Perishability 
Service by its very nature cannot be stored, thus service capacity that goes unutilized is 
perished for good. Furthermore intermediaries in the tourism industry cannot hold 
inventory as demonstration of their commitment (Ng, 2007; Bateson, 1995). As USAID, 
(2007) points out, holiday packages are only saleable up to the date of the flight departures 
especially when one organizes fixed date trips. Thus bed-night capacity in a hotel that is 
not occupied is wasted as it cannot be stored for consuption in the following day. However 
to deal with this potential problem, intermediaries have resorted to practising yield 
management with multiple pricing, segmentation strategies and even overbooking in order 
to maximize yield and reduced unused capacity (Lee and Ng, 2001). 
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2.3.2 Intangibility 
Tourism products are intangible and are bought blind because they cannot be experienced, 
felt, tried or seen by consumers before they are actually consumed. For instance tour 
operators have reverted to preparing brochures which present their products in pictures and 
words thus helping them market and sell their products and services. Notwithstanding this, 
USAID (2007) argues that brochures do not invariably portray an impression of how a 
particular client will experience the product on consumption, thereby complicating the role 
of channel intermediaries in selling service products than selling and distributing physical 
goods (Ng, 2007). 
2.3.3 Simultaneous Production and Consumption 
Package holidays suffer from inseperability as clients get involved in the service process. 
This is due to the fact that service is performance, meaning that one party experiences it 
while another party performs it simultaneously. As a matter of fact, channel intermediaries 
in the tourism industry distribute tangible representation of a promise that service will be 
available for consumption at some point in the future time (Ng, 2007). However the 
tendency of several parties getting involved in the product –from the tour guide to the hotel 
attendants can have an effect on the outcome of the experience on the part of the tourists 
(USAID, 2007). 
2.3.4 Service Inconsistency 
Services are not standardized due to their heterogeneity nature. As Ng, (2007) puts it, 
heterogeneity of service fosters lack of standard of delivery of service product. Holidays 
by their very nature are varied –for instance tourists from Norway visiting lake Manyara 
national park in Tanzania almost invariably will have a different experience whether they 
came in January through March –a period of high season or October through December –a 
period of low season, whether they toured with the same tour operator, stayed in the same 
hotels and ate at the same restaurants (USAID, 2007). 
Reflecting on these characteristics, it is evident that channel conflicts are inevitable should 
the main source of income (tourists) raise complaints of their dissatisfaction. It is therefore 
imperative for channel actors to embrace an attitude of ‘all-for-one and one-for-all’ to 
achieve their rather differring business motives while serving the clients to their 
satisfaction. 
  
13 
2.4 Relevance of Tanzania as a Research Setting 
Tanzania is among the least developed countries in the world; however it is emerging as 
one of the fastest growing economies in Africa (KPMG, 2014). Nonetheless some sectors 
such as tourism have emerged to boost economic growth through foreign income earnings 
as well as direct effects of employment opportunities to the locals (WTO, 2004; 
UNCTAD, 2008). The profound positive multiplier impact of tourism on economic growth 
affects other economic sectors (Youell, 1998), such as agriculture, transport and 
construction. In this regard tourism industry needs to be looked at in great depth by 
practitioners and government agencies so that proper policies are enacted that will benefit 
the wider population hence alleviate poverty. 
As the tourism industry is expanding rapidly (WTTC, 2015), complex inter-firm 
relationships are expected to emerge. Thus there is the potential for conflicts, self-serving 
behavior of channel actors and overly asymmetrical dependence among others. All these 
factors are relevant in an ever-growing economy such as Tanzania. In this regard Tanzania 
justifies being the relevant research setting. Besides, findings in this research serve to 
corroborate existing evidence from similar studies conducted in the developed world. 
Nonetheless it is expected to contribute in the formulation of policies and regulations that 
will govern buyer-seller relationships in the Tanzania’s tourism industry. Specifically, by 
enacting policies and business practices that encourage a level playing field for actors in 
the tourism industry. Importantly, this study focuses on the exchange relationship between 
tour operators –hereafter the buyers, and accommodation establishments –hereafter the 
suppliers. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented and discussed tourism trends in Tanzania. In particular growth 
patterns and forecast have been presented. The chapter also discussed various issues 
surrounding the business of tour operators including their relationship with 
accommodation establishments. The chapter has pointed out key marketing issues of 
relevance in the tourism industry including service characteristics. The Tanzania’s tourism 
value chain which typically reflects major actors in the tourism industry in Tanzania has 
also been presented. The chapter has also presented the relevance of Tanzania as a research 
setting. The next chapter presents theoretical background that is relevant for this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents literature review and discusses theoretical perspectives that are 
relevant to this study. Three theoretical perspectives inform this study namely; Transaction 
Cost Analysis (TCA), Relational Contracting Theory (RCT), and Resource Dependence 
Theory. The three theoretical perspectives are used to develop the conceptual model of this 
study. Relevant constructs regarding antecedents to opportunism in a buyer-seller 
relationship are derived from these theoretical perspectives. 
3.2 Transaction Cost Analysis 
The origin of TCA goes back as far as 1930s. It was first propounded by Ronald Coase and 
John Commons who posited that transactions can be governed in different ways, however 
each governance structure differs from one another based on their respective transaction 
costs (Coase, 1937; Commons, 1934). Following the contributions laid down by Coase and 
Common, TCA was further developed by other economists such as Oliver Williamson 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Since then TCA has become one of the most dominant 
theoretical paradigm for economists, theorists and other audiences, especially in the 
marketing discipline and organizations in the business-to-business domain. 
TCA theorists contend that, transaction costs assume different forms, as they may be direct 
costs or opportunity costs emanating from foregone alternative transaction. Nonetheless 
they posit that, transaction costs arise ex ante when establishing agreements such as when 
drafting and negotiating terms of exchange or ex post when monitoring exchange partner’s 
performance and enforcing agreements so that exchange partners act according to 
contractual stipulations (Joshi and Stump, 1999; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson 
1985). 
According to Williamson (1985; 1979) each transaction has its own set of characteristics 
and that using external market mechanism as governance structure of eceonomic activity 
results into transaction costs. However extant literature on TCA informs that exchange 
relationships may be governed through market mechanism where demand and supply 
forces determine the price, or through non-market mechanisms such as hierarchy and 
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hybrid governance structures (Rindfleisch et al., 2010; Buvik and Haugland, 2005; Buvik 
and Grønhaug, 2000; Bello, Dant and Lohtia, 1997; Heide, 1994; Williamson, 1991). 
The use of price merchanism as a governance structure in a transaction is argued to be 
efficient as it reduces transaction costs because of relative ease with which a buyer can 
switch to an alternative supplier in case of poor perfomance. As Rindfleisch and Heide 
(1997) put it, the costs of conducting economic exchange in a market may exceed the costs 
of organizing the exchange within a single firm –vertical integration. In this regard the 
exchange hazards are attenuated on the strength of symmetrical information –perfect 
information between a buyer and seller. However Williamson (1975) points out that 
market merchanism may fail due to certain characteristics that are embedded in a 
transaction such as uncertainty and transaction-specific investment which render market 
merchanisms inefficient means of organizing exchange (Heide, 1994) and therefore a need 
for non-market mechanisms arises. 
Hierarchy governance structure involves vertical integration where relationships are 
mediated through authority structures such as the use of rules, procedures, standard 
operating procedures, incentive systems and monitoring mechanisms (Wang et al., 2013; 
Rindfleisch et al., 2010; Heide, 1994). On the other hand, hybrid governace mechanism 
involves bilateral adaptations by exchange parties aimed at achieving a common objective 
(Heide, 1994). Such adaptations create dependence trap as a result of small number 
conditions and presence of high switching costs (Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000). In this 
regard a weaker exchange party may become a victim of opportunistic behaviour by a 
stronger party (Rokkan et al., 2003). 
More recently a wave of studies conducted on plural forms of governance has been 
observed (Rindfleisch et al., 2010). These studies affirm that plural forms of governance 
arise in business-to-business transactions characterised with multiple exchange hazards 
such as adaptation, performance evaluation, and safeguarding problems (ibid.). The 
presence of aforementioned exchange hazards in a business-to-business relationship 
renders application of single governance structure by exchange parties inefficient as single 
governance modes are likely to result into increased transaction costs (Rindfleisch et al., 
2010; Heide and Wathne, 2006). 
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3.2.1 Behavioral Assumptions 
The behavioral assumptions that underly TCA include opportunism and bounded 
rationality. These assumptions are described in detail in the next two subsections: 
3.2.1.1 Opportunism 
The extant literature through the foundation of the transaction cost analysis has been able 
to develop opportunism construct, however much of the focus has been on strategies for 
controlling opportunism that arises in interfirm relationships, forgetting the main 
opportunism label (Wathne and Heide, 2000). Nonetheless, Wathne and Heide (2000) 
further argue that the consequence of missing out on the opportunism label itself has 
rendered the strategies of tackling opportunism ineffective. As Wang et al., (2013) put it, 
opportunism has the potential of degrading performance hence the emergence of channel 
conflicts due to dissatisfaction. It is the compatitive erosion which results from 
opportunistic behavior that has motivated many scholars to study drivers of opportunism 
(Wang et al., 2013). Eventhough extant literature on TCA generally views opportunism as 
a fixed exogenous condition; there has been a growing number of recent studies which 
view opportunism as an endogenous condition that needs to be explained (Wang et al., 
2013; Wathne and Heide, 2000; Anderson, 1988; John, 1984). 
 Opportunism Defined 
The real definition of opportunism still remains controversial as the complexity of the 
phenomenon has not been fully explored and researched in the extant literature. 
Williamson (1985) defines opportunism as self-interest seeking with guile and ranges from 
lying, stealing, cheating and all kinds of deceit, and due to nature, humans have the 
tendency of acting in accordance with self-interest. He further describes it as to the 
incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse (Williamson, 1985). 
Maitland, Bryson and Van Den Ven (1985) bring about the problem of cooperation, which 
links interest from sociologists and organization theorists as the point of departure in 
defining opportunism and further observe that opportunism neither is ubiquitous nor is it 
very unusual. From a marketing perspective, opportunism can be generalized in behaviors 
such as falsification of expense reports, breach of distribution contracts, bait-and-switch 
tactics, quality shirking and violation of promotion agreements (Wathne and Heide, 2000). 
  
17 
Wathne and Heide (2000) argue that opportunistic behaviors have practical implications, 
in that if the risk of opportunism is high, substantial resources will have to be used on 
control and monitoring, which could be deployed for other economic usage. Wathne and 
Heide (2000) have brought forward three major factors contributing to the complexity of 
defining and understanding the opportunism phenomenon. These include few studies that 
have measured opportunism, the unresolved questions pertaining to the conceptual 
definition of opportunism construct and lastly the broad range of potential behaviors that 
define opportunism, leaving more room for more research and exploration of the 
phenomenon. 
According to TCA literature exchange parties may behave opportunistically against each 
other given a chance (Barney, 1990) and if they can get away with it, and if it is profitable 
to do so (Wang et al., 2013; Rindfleisch et al., 2010; Williamson 1985). It is therefore 
difficult to know who is trustworthy a priori, (Barney, 1990). Interestingly, scholars and 
researchers have different conceptualizations on the opportunism phenomenon. 
Williamson (1985) describes active and passive forms and both ex ante and ex post types 
of opportunism. Ex ante and ex post opportunism have been adopted from the insurance 
literature under adverse selection and moral hazard, respectively (Williamson, 1985). 
Barney and Ouchi (1988), also point out three types of opportunism namely; adverse 
selection, moral hazards, and hold up. According to these authors adverse selection is an 
ex ante opportunism that arises when there is information asymmetry thus exchange 
parties cannot establish the true attributes of their counterparts a priori which affect their 
future performance. On the other hand moral hazard emanates from information 
asymmetry about the true attributes of an exchange partner with respect to their current 
performance capabilities (ibid.). Accordingly hold up situation represents opportunistic 
behavior that arises from unilateral idiosyncratic investment in an exchange relationship. 
Thus this investment creates an incentive of an investor being taken advantage of (Wang et 
al., 2013). 
Nonetheless, building on the work of Williamson (1985), Wathne and Heide (2000) 
expounded on the two categories of opportunistic behaviors, which are active and passive 
opportunism, regarding to whether a party either engages in or refrains from some actions, 
and whether the above mentioned take place within existing or new circumstances. Below 
is a presentation of the forms of opportunism in the existing and new circumstances as 
summarized by Wathne and Heide (2000). 
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Figure 3.1 Forms of Opportunism 
 
Source: Adapted from Wathne and Heide (2000) 
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Cell 1, a cross-section between passive opportunism and existing circumstances is aimed at 
cost saving, and include a range of actions like shirking and evasion of obligations of 
particular transactions. This may only last on a short-term basis. In the long run, for 
instance quality shirking creates customer dissatisfaction hence adversely affecting 
revenues, which is the joint value of the parties involved in transactions. 
Cell 2 depicts passive opportunism under new circumstances, increasing short term 
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inflexibility or refusal to adapt. The direct cost effect is minimal however, and the 
inflexibility of one party ends up hurting all parties involved in the exchange (Wathne and 
Heide, 2000). 
Cell 3 demonstrates active opportunism under existing circumstances. According to 
Wathne and Heide (2000), one party engages in behaviors that were explicitly or implicitly 
prohibited in the course of the transactions. A clear example is violation of territory 
distribution restrictions, leading to costly monitoring and control strategies. The party that 
acts opportunistically increases its revenues on short term while decreasing on the long 
term the revenues of the exchange partner involved (Wathne and Heide, 2000). 
Cell 4 shows active opportunism under new circumstances. In this scenario, one party uses 
the circumstances arising to extract concessions from the exchange partner. The 
mechanism applied here is aimed to redistribute the wealth to act in favor of the 
opportunistic party (Wathne and Heide, 2000). There are also the costs and revenue 
effects. On the costs side, there is increase of haggling and bargaining costs on the 
exchange partner. The revenue effect is two-sided, increasing revenue for the opportunistic 
party in the short term, while decreasing exchange partner’s long term revenues due to 
maladaptation. Therefore, opportunism may lead to opportunity costs (Wathne and Heide, 
2000). 
Furthermore opportunism is arguably enhanced by certain characteristics that are 
embedded in a transaction such as behavioral uncertainty which increases information 
asymmetry (Wang et al., 2013; Ouchi, 1980). Wathne and Heide (2000) assert that 
behavioral uncertainty presents transactional hazards as it may result into a lock-in 
situation where a focal firm cannot leave the relationship without sustaining some 
economic loss, thus (Wang et al., 2013; Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006) increasing 
incentives for exchange partners to act opportunistically. In this light a focal firm locked-in 
an exchange relationship has an option of only staying in the relationship and persevere 
opportunistic behaviors of the corresponding partner (Wathne and Heide, 2000). As John 
(1984) affirms, the potential to engage in opportunism in a long term relationship is likely 
and is dictated by the extent to which the relationship can easily be terminated and 
economic feasibility of doing so. The harder it is to exit the relationship (i.e. dependence 
trap) and the higher the cost associated with switching to alternative sources, the more 
prone an investor is to opportunism. 
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While Joshi and Stump (1996) have found opportunism to be the source of dysfunctional 
conflict in an exchange relationship that undermines quality relationship, Gassenheimer 
(1996) found out that opportunism negatively influence satisfaction, thus weakening 
relationship continuation (Parkhe, 1993) 
In this regard TCA literature proposes safeguarding/governance mechanisms that act as 
deterrent towards opportunistic behavior in a buyer-seller relationship thus enhancing good 
performance, relationship continuation, and satisfaction. While vertical integration is 
suggested as one of the governance mechanism (Williamson, 1991), it is a costly 
alternative due to resource requirement and red tape procedures associated with carrying 
operations internally (Harrigan, 1985). On the other hand, hybrid governance merchanism 
has been found to have a significant impact on exchange hazards. For instance Buvik 
(2002) studied the impact of inter-firm coordination (i.e. hybrid) on transaction costs in the 
presence of specific investment. Likewise Stump and Heide (1996) examined the 
manufacturer’s governance mechanisms such as incentives and monitoring that have 
potential of attenuating supplier’s opportunism. Though market mechanism is just as an 
effective means of deterring opportunism in a buyer-seller relationship, it seems to be 
effective in the presence of symmetrical information and discrete transactions. However 
with firms developing specialized knowledge and capabilities in resources they endow that 
others require for survival, discrete transactions may not hold water and thus exchange 
partners may engage in guileful behavior. Thus central to this study is the antecedents to 
opportunism in the buyer-seller relationship with specific focus on service industry. 
Opportunism is the central theme of this study and is the dependent variable. It is treated as 
such in the succeeding chapters. 
3.2.1.2 Bounded Rationality 
According to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), bounded rationality is the assumption that 
men have constraints on their cognitive competencies, therefore limiting their rationality 
that affect the process of decision making. Bounded rationality can be illustrated with the 
fact that man has no capability of processing large amounts of information and his inability 
to predict future events, exacerbates contractual incompleteness (Grover and Malhotra, 
2003; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
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Therefore the TCA framework acknowledges bounded rationality, which when considered 
with other factors like costs of planning, adapting and monitoring, assigns transactions to 
the relevant governance structures (Williamson, 1985). 
3.2.2 Dimensions of a Transaction 
3.2.2.1 Asset Specificity 
Specific investments are important in marketing strategies and in firms’ relations, as they 
possess value-creation properties (Gosh and John, 1999). As Rokkan et al., (2003) put it, 
specific investments enhance considerable value in buyer-seller relationships due to its 
ability to dissipate opportunism (i.e bonding effect) (Wang et al., 2013). Specific 
investments are durable tangible and intangible investments that firms incur in order to 
facilitate specific buyer-seller transactions (Williamson, 1985; Buvik and Grønhaug 2000). 
Extant literature on transaction specific investment posit on the strength of idiosyncratic 
nature of these investments with a particular supplier, where there is the potential loss of 
value should the assets be redeployed in alternative investments (Wang et al., 2013; 
Rokkan et al., 2003; Buvik and Reve, 2002; Buvik and Andersen, 2002). 
Put differently, specific investments are referred to as, the degree to which transactions 
need to be supported by transaction-specific assets that cannot be redeployed to an 
alternative use without significance depreciation of value of the asset, hence exposing the 
focal investors to opportunistic expropriation ensuing from lock-ins, and dependence on 
the counterparty (Rokkan et al., 2003). The lock-in situation renders the focal firm 
susceptible to opportunistic behavior because its unilateral investment generates a value 
that is worthy of expropriation (Wang et al., 2013) or idiosyncratic investment in the 
relationship renders the focal firm unable to respond to the partner’s opportunistic 
behaviour (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Williamson 1985). 
When asset specificity becomes substantial, terms of trade will move from conventional 
market to small number conditions, prompting the need for safeguards such as contracting 
(hybrid governance) or hierarchical governance (Williamson, 1975). 
According to Williamson (1985), asset specificity takes on importance in relation to 
bounded rationality/opportunism and in the presence of uncertainty. It is nonetheless true 
that, asset specificity is the big locomotive to which transaction cost economics owes 
much of its predictive content. Specifically, the main factor responsible for transaction cost 
differences is the variations in asset specificity (Riordan and Williamson, 1985). If this 
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condition is neglected, nonstandard contracts and monopoly preoccupation of earlier 
contract traditions will emerge (Williamson, 1985). 
Rokkan et al., (2003) discuss of the inherent dilemma asset specificity holds by exploring 
both the exploitation and value creation with regard to opportunistic behaviors. Because 
specific investments cannot be redeployed in other economic exchange relations, the focal 
receiver has the potential to expropriate the investments’ value, exposing the investor into 
risks, a state that discourages investment (Williamson, 1985; Rokkan et al., 2003). The 
outcome is either to tolerate the behavior and incur economic losses or end the relationship 
and incur high switching costs. 
Nevertheless, specific investments lead to value creation, resulting to improved 
coordination among exchange parties, thereby subsuming opportunism. Where the extent 
of returns is sufficiently productive, specific investments may create a bonding effect 
(Rokkan et al., 2003). The effects of specific investment on the receiver depend on the 
future time dimension (extendedness) and norms, that tend to shift expropriation towards 
bonding effect (Rokkan et al., 2003). 
Extendedness is the expectation that a relationship will continue for a favourably 
indeterminate time. Due to the lock-in effect created by specific investments, many 
receivers have the potential of acting opportunistically at investors’ expense (Wathne and 
Heide, 2000). From a prisoner’s dilemma perspective, defecting results into greater pay-
offs at the expense of investor, given a limited time frame. However many exchange 
parties focus on significant expectation of future interactions (Riordan and Williamson, 
1985), therefore as the time frame becomes infinite, parties tend to focus on long-term 
payoffs. Thus cooperation is vital due to parties’ authority to reward or punish actions, 
given the future payoffs are sufficiently valuable (Rokkan et al., 2003). 
According to Rokkan et al., (2003) economic exchange revolves around the norm of 
solidarity, which has a knock-on effect on opportunistic behavior. Norms prescribe the 
code of conduct in a relationship, therefore a weaker norm of solidarity will promote 
opportunism, but strong norms change the receiver expropriations to bonding. Rokkan et 
al., (2003) concluded that buyer-specific investments have a positive effect on 
expropriation for low levels of solidarity norms but higher levels of solidarity norms 
produced bonding effect. 
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Transaction-specific investments tend to have lower value in alternative use thus resulting 
in potentially appropriable quasi-rents (Yenidogan, 2013). Extant literature informs six 
kinds of specific investments; site specificity –for instance when a tour operator relocates 
its premises near a major supplier of accommodation services so as to rationalize processes 
and close monitoring; physical asset specificity –as in extension of accommodation 
establishment’s capacity tailored to a specific relationship with a tour operator; human 
asset specificity –consisting of specialized training, skillset, knowledge as in the case of 
accommodation establsihment training its staff in language to specifically handle clients 
from aspecific tour operator; dedicated assets, brand name capital, and temporal specificity 
(Williamson 1985; 1991; Lohtia, Brooks and Krapfel, 1994). 
Transaction-specific investment is of particular interest in this study and it will be treated 
in the subsequent chapters as an antencedent to opportunism. 
3.2.2.2 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty has been generally described as an individual’s perceived inability to predict 
something accurately because they lack sufficient information or because of the inability to 
filter out irrelevant data (Milliken, 1987; Buchko, 1994). Due to the dynamic economic 
and technological dimensions, uncertainty arises; bringing about adaptation problems 
(Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000). Researchers have regarded uncertainty as a vital factor in 
cases when firms choose governance mode. 
Uncertainty poses a transactional problem of a somewhat different nature. It is a property 
of the decision environment within which transactions take place and refers in a general 
sense to a situation in which the relevant decision contingencies cannot be spelled out ex 
ante. Specifically, uncertainty is exacerbated in the presence of bounded rationality and 
opportunism. Some scholars address the two main kinds of uncertainty as environmental 
uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. 
On the one hand, environmental uncertainty is observed by examining the response of 
firms’ returns to general economic uncertainty, which is an un-diversifiable risk. On the 
other hand, behavioral uncertainty can be described as the possible opportunistic behavior 
of the economic agents, which is much more attributable to opportunism (Williamson, 
1985). 
Williamson (1979) argues that, high environmental uncertainty leads to problems of 
writing comprehensive and costly contracts, creating adaptation problems due to inability 
  
24 
of parties to specify all uncertainties in a contract. Therefore, with high levels of 
uncertainty and limited cognitive capabilities of humans, anticipating future events 
becomes more impossible. 
According to Buvik and Grønhaug (2000), external uncertainty has a positive association 
with dependence which results from lack of self-sufficiency of resources between parties 
without cross-holdings. The concept is related to unpredictability of the environment, and 
can be based on different perspectives of conceptualizations and operationalization. 
3.2.2.3 Frequency of Transactions 
The frequency of transactions is a non-negligible dimension of transactions and has 
primary influence on a firm’s efficacy of alternative interfirm coordination arrangements 
(Buvik, 2000; Buvik and Grønhaug 2000), with a knock-on effect on the level of 
contractual safeguarding (Buvik and Haugland 2002) on the introduction of asset 
specificity. This concept is simply defined as the number of times a transaction takes place 
within a buyer-supplier dyad. Colbert and Spicer (1995) combined volume and frequency 
as the ‘extent’ of transaction. Despite its significance, there is little explicit commentary on 
this transaction dimension in the extant literature (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). 
According to Williamson (1985), three frequency classes exist and include one-time, 
occasional and recurrent frequencies, but the author focuses most on the latter two 
categories. The larger volumes of transactions incorporate the justification for better 
governance structures in order to reduce costs of transactions (Colbert and Spicer, 1995). 
Furthermore, Williamson (1985) and Buvik (2000) posit that, the cost of specialized 
governance structures will be easier to recover for large and recurring transactions, making 
the frequency of transactions a relevant dimension in the TCA framework. 
Cell 1 in Figure 3.2 demonstrates low frequency of transactions given high asset 
specificity which brings about efficacy problems due to underutilisation of special 
government arrangements leading to administrative diseconomies of scale in terms of set-
up costs (Buvik, 2000). 
Cell 2 in Figure 3.2 portrays high frequency of transactions coupled with the employment 
of specific assets which influence the specialised governance efficacy (Buvik 2000) for the 
purpose of safeguarding the investments at risk (Williamson 1985), with the aim of 
avoiding a lock-in situation as a result of existing inter-firm dependence. 
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Cell 3 in Figure 3.2 portrays low asset specificity coupled with high transaction 
frequencies. The products are standardized in nature and appeal to many buyers, therefore 
the extent of opportunism dissipates due to collective insurance of the market as a form of 
governance mechanism (Buvik 2000). 
Cell 4 in Figure 3.2 demonstrates low asset specificty and low frequency with the need of 
subtle governance implications, the possibility of aggregating the demands of similar but 
independent transactions is suggested (Williamson 1985). Market governance is the most 
appropriate form of governance coordination because it is difficult to obtain administrative 
economies of scale advantages as the result of occasional order frequencies (Buvik 2000). 
The figure below illustrates the different frequency of exchange scenarios with the 
employment of asset specificity. 
Figure 3.2: Frequency of Exchange and Asset Specificity 
 
Source: Adapted from Buvik (2000) 
It follows that, administrative economies of scale is achieved as transaction frequencies 
increase. There is also a positive association between order frequency and asset specificity 
which in turn positively affect cooordination activities in order to safeguard the specific 
investments made (Williamson 1985; Buvik 2000). 
3.3 Relational Contracting Theory 
Relational Contracting Theory (RCT) postulates that when firms in an exchange 
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the potential opportunistic exploitation inherent in exchange parties (Bradach and Eccles, 
1989; Buvik and Halskau, 2001; Granovetter, 1985). Moreover, the theory predicts that 
prior business engagements in an exchange relationship is expected to develop certain 
relational norms, behaviors, and trust that invariably govern the manner in which 
manufacturers and suppliers interact with each other in an exchange relationship (Buvik 
and Reve, 2002; Macneil, 1978). 
According to Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman, (1992), trust refers to the willingness to 
rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence. Thus existence of trust in an 
exchange relationship reduces the need for contractual safeguarding against unprecedented 
future events. However it is important to note that trust emanates from exchange 
relationships that occur over time. Thus duration of relationship is an important construct 
(Buvik and Halskau, 2001; Lusch and Brown, 1996). 
3.3.1 Relationship Duration, Trust, Relational Norms and Opportunism 
This subsection is of particular relevance to this study, the variables trust and relationship 
duration will receive special treatment in our research model and subsequent discussions. 
In the relational exchange theory, the core element of business relationships is the prior 
duration or link duration which strongly identifies with relational governance (Burki and 
Buvik, 2010). The prior history of relationship leads to elvolment of relational norms, trust 
and shared values, which in time subsume opportunistic behavior of exchange parties 
(Buvik and Halskau, 2001). Specifically, the relationship’s status over time acts as the 
point of reference for establishing on-going terms of trade, inter-firm interactions and 
contracting practices (Buvik and Halskau, 2001). 
However, exchange partners have limited understanding of each other’s norms and values 
in the initial stages of their business relationship, making initial trust very fragile (Heide, 
1994; Burki and Buvik, 2010). Nonetheless, Wathne and Heide (2000) argue that, as time 
goes by, the norms stand as informal agreements even if formal contracts exist because 
formal contracts are limited due to their finite duration in nature. 
Trust, as a relational norm, is generally an important recipe to build enduring relationships. 
Gradual trust (Burki and Buvik, 2010; Jeffries and Reed, 2000) permits greater flexibility 
in selection of governance structures where asset specificity is present and also results to 
closer relationships that require less detailed contracts. 
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According to Burki and Buvik (2010) relational norms set boundaries on permissible limits 
on behaviors of partners, hence safeguarding against opportunistic behavior and ex post 
transaction costs associated with conflicts and the control and monitoring measures for 
eradicating opportunism. For instance, Joshi and Stump (1999) found out that relational 
norms have a positive association with both dependence and long-term orientation, which 
deter opportunism. 
The relational contracting theory in relevance to the study is expected to determine the 
relationship between a tour operator and its significant accommodation establishment due 
to the business interactions over time. The relationships are expected to have some levels 
of trustworthy which are expected to deter opportunism even in the presence of formal 
contracts. Therefore, it is expected that tour operators, in relationships characterized by 
friendships, trustworthiness and mutual values, face less opportunistic behaviors from the 
accommodation establishments. 
3.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependence theory (RDT) owes its foundation on early works in the social 
exchange theory, for example, the power-dependence (Emerson, 1962) that is centered on 
power and power use. The theory postulates that organizations are faced with constraints 
from their task environment and therefore proactively strive to manage the constraints and 
uncertainty resulting from the needed resources. As the result of such interdependencies, 
many organizations have their primary functions embedded in the activities of other 
organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
RDT was originally formulated as an alternative to economic theories of mergers and 
interlocks, focusing entirely on the inter-organizational relations that have lately resulted 
to market failure (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The theory argues that, some organizations 
have more power than others because of their particularities in their interdependencies and 
social stature, for instance the governments as substantial providers of resources and their 
multiple suppliers, making the government dictate terms in their exchange relations 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
The basic premise of the theory states that, firms confronted with external uncertainty will 
tend to restructure their exchange relationships by creating formal or informal negotiated 
environments with other firms such as contracting, joint ventures and mergers (Buvik and 
Reve, 2002; Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000; Heide, 1994). 
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The theory limits organization performance to effective considerations by focusing on the 
ability to satisfy external organizations’ demands (Heide, 1994). Some scholars such as 
(Buvik and Reve, 2002) have combined the RDT with transaction cost analysis to examine 
the buyers’ bargaining power effect on contractual safeguarding of relation-specific 
investments. The conclusion was that buyer’s bargaining power has influence with the 
safeguarding of relation-specific assets (Buvik and Reve, 2002). 
3.4.1 Resource Dependence and Opportunism 
According to (Heide, 1994), the lack of self-sufficiency in terms of resources creates both 
dependence and uncertainty for the firms in need of the resources. Because organizations 
are open systems that rely on input and output resources for their survival, uncertainty ends 
up reducing their ability to control the flow of resources leading to adaptation problems 
and difficulties in information processing (Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000). 
Resources are directly proportional to power, and resource dependence is positively 
correlated with opportunistic behavior. Some studies have analyzed the relationship 
between resources and power, concluding that organizations controlling resources have 
power over the actors in need of such resources (Provan, Beyer and Krutbosch, 1980; 
Nienhuser, 2008); giving more evidence on the RDT assumption that, an organization has 
more power as it controls more resources (Nienhuser, 2008). 
Opportunism involves gaining advantages over other organizations; therefore it can be 
related to power because one party can influence the decisions of another in favor of its 
own needs (Provan and Skinner, 1989). Therefore, the power exercised over another is 
directly linked to the level of dependence regarding their capabilities and responsibilities 
and the dependence tends to be more pronounced by factors of importance, scarcity and 
non-substitutability (Rodriguez-Ginorio, 2009). 
Power has been described as a property of social relation rather than the attribute of the 
actor, driven by differences across alternatives (Emerson, 1962; Wolfe and McGinn, 
2005), as the potential to change the behavior or overcome some level of resistance of a 
target (Dahl, 1957) or the deployment of means to achieve intended results (Cobb, 1984). 
Buyer-supplier relationships are initiated to achieve significant performances and 
competitive advantages over rivals (Wang et al., 2013) and are one of the most important 
resources a company can have because organizations are never self-sufficient. The lack of 
self-sufficiency in the context of resources creates dependence on the parties controlling 
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the resources; bringing power-structure asymmetries, prompting dominant partners to 
expect greater payoffs and opening doors for opportunistic behavior (Yaqub, 2009; Provan 
and Skinner, 1989). 
Nevertheless, any organization, regardless of its dominance or dependence, can engage in 
opportunistic behavior. Provan and Skinner (1989) explain the aspect of opportunism by 
focusing on dependence and power and control between dealers and suppliers of farm 
equipment. The degree of dependence will tend to vary across dealers, for instance due to 
availability of alternative suppliers and the internal strength of the dealer (Provan and 
Skinner, 1989). Provan and Skinner (1989)’s conclusions were that; opportunistic behavior 
by dealers is negatively related to dealer dependence on the supplier and also opportunistic 
behavior by dealers with supplier has a positive relationship to supplier control over dealer 
decisions. 
However, heavily dependent parties are not likely to act opportunistically for the fear of 
retaliation by the dominant supplier who has power to take them out of business (Provan 
and Skinner, 1989). In some exceptions, high dependence could mean high levels of 
cooperation between parties, resulting to lesser opportunistic behavior in consideration of 
duration (Provan and Skinner, 1989). 
With regard to this study, it is expected that the aspect of power in relation to resource 
dependence exists in buyer-seller relationships due to the resources each party holds; that 
is accommodation services for accommodation establishments, and the volume of tourists 
for the tour operators. Dominant firms; both accommodation establishments and tour 
operators are expected to use their resource power to maximize their business 
expectations; therefore bringing the equation of opportunism toward weaker firms. In 
some cases of high levels of interdependence of resources, it is expected that high levels of 
cooperation will occur, and have a negative effect on opportunism between tour operators 
and accommodation establishments. 
Buyer dependence and purchasing volume are interesting because we will especially look 
into the problem of asymmetrical dependence and treat it as an antecedent to opportunism. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented and discussed transaction cost analysis, relational contracting 
theory and resource dependence theory as three main theories that inform this study. 
Transaction cost analysis informs that bounded rationality, opportunism, specific assets 
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and uncertainty are presents whenever a transaction takes place. Unilateral specific 
investments lead to dependence of one exchange partner on the other which increases the 
propensity of a more powerful exchange partner to act opportunistically towards a weaker 
party. Relational contracting theory informs that, relationship duration, norms and trust 
guide the behavior of exchange partners in a buyer-seller relationship thus reducing moral 
hazards. Moreover, unilateral dependence creates a lock-in condition rendering a focal 
firm susceptible to opportunistic exploitation by the underinvested party. The next chapter 
presents conceptual model and its proposed hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter laid down the theoretical foundation upon which this chapter builds. 
The chapter goes on to developing hypotheses relevant to this study. Based on the 
theoretical background in the preceding chapter, five independent variables and one 
control variable are identified and used to establish the conceptual model for this study as 
portrayed in Figure 4.1. The research model in Figure 4.1 consists of both direct effects 
and interaction effects as indicated by the arrows. Furthermore the chapter presents a 
robust discussion of hypotheses developed for possible effects, empirical test of which is 
presented in chapter eight. 
4.2 An Overview of the Research’s Conceptual Model 
The research model in this study seeks to explore the antecedents to opportunism in a tour 
operator-accommodation estabishment relationship in the Tanzania’s tourism industry by 
empirically testing the influence of independent variables: trust (TRUST); buyer 
dependence (BUYDEP); relationship duration (DURAT); purchase volume 
(PURCHVOL); and buyer transaction-specific investment (BUYSPEC) on the dependent 
variable: supplier opportunism (OPPORT). The model also includes one control variable; 
percentage of annual accommodation needs a tour operator obtains from a specific supplier 
(ACNEED) based on its potential influence on the perceived latter’s opportunism. 
We delineate a priori that only an overview of the possible effects is given as evidenced in 
Figure 4.1. Specifically we focus attention on three hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3) and one 
control variable to cast a glimpse of light on the research problem at hand. It follows that 
we expect a negative association exists between the level of both inter-personal and inter-
firm trust and supplier opportunism (H1) in Figure 4.1. Trust is the product of past 
successful encounters, that is, exchange parties have consistently been able to discharge 
their responsibilities. It is the past experience that makes exchange parties reliable and 
trustworthy. Exchange partners turn to act in a manner that protects the interest of all 
parties involved in the exchange thus dissipating potential opportunistic expropriation. 
On the other hand hypothesis (H2) concerns the interplay between relationship duration 
and asymetrical buyer dependence on supplier opportunism. The proposed negative 
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association follows the reasoning that, as buyer-seller relationship evolves over time 
relational norms, shared values and trust emerge, these act as the cushion against 
opportunistic exploitation that would otherwise be perpetrated by asymmetrical 
dependence. 
Moreover, hypothesis (H3) concerns the interplay between annual purchase volume and 
unilateral buyer-held transaction-specific investment on supplier opportunism. The 
proposed negative association follows the reasoning that, a substantial annual purchasing 
volume creates relative dependence on the part of the supplier such that opportunistic 
expropriation that would otherwise be enforced by asymmetrical specific investment by 
the buyer is attenuated. 
The control variable (ACNEED) is expected to influence supplier’s opportunism in as far 
as dependence is concerned, hence the positive effect. 
Figure 4.1: Research Model 
 
Source: Authors’ own formulation based on literature review 
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4.3 Research Hypotheses 
The research hypotheses below are developed based on determined factors under buyer-
supplier relationship in the tourism network. Literature review on transaction cost analysis 
(TCA), resource dependence theory (RDT) and relational contracting theory (RCT) 
together with insights from exploratory desk review on the Tanzania’s tourism industry 
made it possible the development of the underlying hypotheses in this study. 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Supplier Opportunism (OPPORT) 
Williamson (1975) who is the father of TCA defines opportunism as ‘self-interest seeking 
with guile.’ Though opportunism itself as a concept is very broadly explored in a buyer-
seller relationship, there seems to exist different categorization of kinds of opportunism in 
the extant literature. For instance Wathne and Heide (2000) identify three kinds of 
opportunism: adverse selection which represents ex-ante opportunism where an exchange 
partner purposely withholds information of subject matter in a transaction before a 
relationship is entered (Akerloff, 1970); strong form opportunism which occurs when an 
exchange partner breaches explicit or implicit terms of agreements stated before 
relationship was entered into; and moral hazard which represents passive form 
opportunism and occurs when an exchange partner misconstrues, distorts information, 
disguises or misleads the other party in order to protect its own interest, quality shirking or 
failing to fulfill promises or obligations stated in the contract (Wathne and Heide, 2000; 
John, 1984; Williamson, 1985). 
Barney and Ouchi, (1988) on the other hand categorize opportunism forms as adverse 
selection –where an exchange party’s true attributes cannot be established a priori due to 
information asymmetry; moral hazard –where an exchange party’s current performance 
capabilities cannot be established by the focal firm due to information asymmetry; and 
hold-up –which arises from unilateral idiosyncratic investments that create the potential for 
exploitation by the focal receiver. 
According to extant literature opportunism presents a biggest setback to supply chain 
integration (Ellram, 1991). Nonetheless opportunism is a well-debated topic in the 
academic literature (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Rokkan and Buvik, 2003; Rokkan et al., 
2003; Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2010; Joshi and Stump 1999; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; 
Sabel, 1993; Barney and Ouchi, 1988). Thus opportunism construct in this study is 
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designed to capture the degree to which accommodation establishments behave in ways 
consistent with self-interest seeking in relation to tour operators. Such behaviors include; 
overpromising, haggling of costs and avoidance of responsibilities, false accusation and 
deliberate withholding of information. 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
4.3.2.1 The Association between Trust and Supplier Opportunism 
For a buyer-supplier relationship to flourish there needs to be mutual understanding and 
consistent discharge of exchange partners’ duties and responsibilities. Such consistency 
creates confidence in the exchange partner which consequently builds up trust. The need 
for trust in the service industry is of particular importance due to the increased risks and 
uncertainty which ensue from the extent to which an exchange partner is unable to 
evaluate service attributes before it is actually purchased (Parasuraman, Zeithaml and 
Berry, 1985). 
Trust emanates from good rapport between exchange partners, and is the product of 
successful past buyer-supplier interactions which induce the willingness of an exchange 
partner to rely on its counterpart (Moorman et al., 1992). Specifically trust in a business 
relationship does not emerge overnight; it is cultivated over time through many exchange 
encounters. Thus good history of prior encounters leads to exchange partners developing 
interpersonal and inter-organizational trust between them (Heide, 1994; Dwyer et al., 
1987; Anderson and Weitz, 1989).  
Once trust is established in an exchange relationship it sets a boundary on the permissible 
behavior of exchange partners (Burki and Buvik, 2010), increasing tolerence for exchange 
partner’s behavior (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Håkansson and Sharma, 1996; Ganesan, 
1994) consequently dissipating the opportunistic tendencies inherent in exchange parties, 
thereby enabling them to look out for one another. As Anderson and Narus (1990) put it, 
exchange partners are expected to perform actions that enhance positive outcomes for their 
organizations and do away with unexpected actions that may bring forth negative payoffs.  
Nonetheless Heide (1994) posits that, inter-organization trust acts as a form of governance 
mechanism against opportunism in exchange transactions that are characterized by 
dependence and uncertainty. Following this line of reasoning, we argue that the presence 
of trust in the tour operator–accommodation establishment relationship is expected to 
attenuate the latter’s opportunism. Thus this study hypothesizes that: 
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H1 There is a negative association between the level of trust and opportunism in the tour 
operator-accommodation establishment relationship. 
4.3.2.2 Interaction Effects 
4.3.2.2.1 Buyer Dependence, Relationship Duration, and Supplier Opportunism  
 Buyer Dependence (BUYDEP) 
Organizations are viewed as open systems (Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000). An open system 
receives inputs at one end, processes them and gives out output at the other end. 
Nevertheless open system interacts with external environment for constant flow of 
resources into and out the system. However organizations as open system have finite 
amount of resources they endow something that renders them dependent on other 
organizations for certain critical resources they need to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Dwyer et al., 1987). 
As organizations are not self-sufficient in economic resources they invariably enter into 
exchange relationship in order to reduce environmental uncertainty by exchanging 
resources for mutual benefit (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000). 
Such exchange relationship may result into one partner becoming heavily reliant on their 
counterpart in such a way that should the relationship be terminated prematurely by the 
less dependent party the more dependent party will incur significant transaction costs 
searching, qualifying and switching to alternative supplier(s). 
Depending on the distribution of power structure between the transacting parties, 
asymmetrical dependence (Emerson, 1962) may create moral hazards where the party that 
perceives itself in a stonger position exploits their weaker counterpart. Majority of 
accommodation establishments in Tanzania are located in strategic tourist resorts such as 
game parks and important historical towns. Tour operators who are the main buyers of 
accommodation services from these establishments are locked up in a dependence trap 
because one way or the other they have to take their clients to these establishments for the 
reasons such as high availability of bednights, good reputation, high quality of services and 
satisfying clients’ reguirements based on the recommendations from other clients. Having 
this competitive advantage in mind the accommodation establishments may resort to 
expoit exchange situations at the expense of the tour operators. Thus the more dependent a 
tour operator is on a particular accommodation establishment the more likely they run the 
risk of being taken advantage of by their counterpart. 
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The tour operators asymmetrical dependence on accommodation establishments creates the 
potential for inter-organizational conflicts (Rokkan and Buvik, 2003) due to power shift 
and alteration of an exchange party’s behavior by the other (Gaski, 1984; Bucklin and 
Sengupta, 1993) which provides structural power to the less dependent party in an 
exchange relationship (Ganesan 1994; Anderson and Narus, 1984; Lacoste and Johnsen, 
2015). 
Notwithstanding this, the establishment of relational norms may serve to moderate the 
opportunism on the part of the accommodation establishment that arises from 
asymmetrical power-dependence structure (Rokkan and Buvik, 2003) between tour 
operators and accommodation establishments. As Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) and Heide 
and John (1990) affirm, a long and stable prior history of relationship builds trust and 
commitment between exchange parties, which in turn promotes effective communication, 
information sharing and joint pay-offs (Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
 Relationship Duration (DURAT) 
The advocates of relational contracting theory argue that, lasting relationship between 
exchange parties is the key element that fosters desired outcomes (Anderson, 1995; 
Anderson and Narus, 1990; Dwyer et al., 1987). Furthermore relational contracting 
theorists view contracts as form of governance mechanism which include many complex 
aspects of interactions between different firms (Heide, 1994; Macneil, 1980). As more 
interactions occur, buyer-seller relationship starts to form. Over time the relationship takes 
effect due to relational norms and shared values of organizations in an exchange 
relationship (Heide and John, 1990; Macneil, 1980). 
As relationship evolves over time personal relationship tends to emerge out of shared 
values, the shared values and relational norms guide the manner in which buyer-seller 
relationships are organized (Buvik, Andersen and Grønhaug, 2014; Buvik and John, 2000; 
Macneil, 1980). Nonetheless Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) point out that, norms are an 
important recipe for maintaining a stable and regular relationship. This is due to the fact 
that norms create expectations about behaviour that are at least shared by a group of 
decision makers (Heide and John, 1992). 
The shared norms such as trust and personal relationship established in time then act as a 
reference point for acceptable behaviour of trading partners thus counteracting 
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opportunistic inclinations of the exchange parties (Buvik and Reve, 2002; Buvik and 
Halskau, 2001; Buvik and Burki, 2010; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Stinchcombe, 1987).  
In light of the preceding discussions we affirm that the presence of a well established 
exchange reationship, relational norms emerge; and these in turn build up trust between the 
exchange parties (Dwyer et al., 1987), guide the way in which transactions are organized 
and may create strong social bonds (Barney and Hansen, 1994). Thus, the prior length of 
relationships attennuates adversarial tendencies in an exchange reationship because 
exchange parties have had time to eveluate each others’ capabilities and develop personal 
relationships necessary to complement their general similarities and core mission of their 
existence (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993). 
Following this argument we expect that in the presence of a well established relationship 
between tour operators and accommodation establishments’ opportunism is weakened 
regardless of the extent to which the tour operators are dependent upon accommodation 
establishments. Specifically we argue that tour operators who have been in a longer buyer-
seller relationship with accommodation establishments perceive the latter as being less 
opportunistic as relationship duration is expected to reduce accommodation 
establishments’ opportunism. Figure 4.2 below illustrates this argument. 
Figure 4.2: Moderating Effect of Relationship Duration and Tour Operators’ Dependence 
on Accommodation Establishments’ Opportunism 
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Figure 4.2 above illustrates the moderating effect of relationship duration on the influence 
of tour operator’s dependence on accommodation establishment’s opportunism. In the first 
column; when relationship duration is reltively short i.e a new born relationship, increased 
tour operator dependence on accommodation establishment strongly increases the latter’s 
opportunism as indicated by a long vertical arrow. On the contrary, the second column 
depicts that when tour operator-accommodation establishment relationship has matured - 
lasted a long time, increasing tour operator’s dependence increases accommodation 
establishment’s opportunism at a much lower level. Reduced opportunism could result 
form well established and internalized relational norms, trust, and business assurance (i.e. 
constant flow of resources) on the part of accommodation establishment that have accrued 
with time. Consider the matrix in figure 4.3 below for further explanation. 
Figure 4.3: Matrix of Tour Operators’ Dependence, Relationship Duration and 
Accommodation Establishments’ Opportunism 
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dealing with a particular accommodation establishment such that the latter’s opportunism 
is significantly dampened because both tour operators and accommodation establishments 
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have developed strong social bonds (Barney and Hansen, 1994) as the result of embedded 
relational norms and trust that have accrued with time. Increased tour operator’s 
dependence over time echoes consistent availability of bednights and high level of 
integrity and honesty on the part of accommodation establishment. Thus regardless of tour 
operator’s high dependence on accommodation establishment, in the presence of long prior 
history of relationship the perceived accommodation establishment’s opportunism is low. 
Cell 3 reveals that when the tour operator-accommodation establishment relationship is at 
its infancy stage, where the tour operator’s dependence on the latter is low, the perception 
of the tour operator on supplier’s opportunism is that accommodation establishment’s 
opportunism is low/modest, consistent with Deeds and Hill (1999)’s argument that 
exchange parties experience lower levels of opportunism early in their relationship. 
Additionally, at this point in time, a tour operator may happen to have several options 
available at their disposal and is still learning about and weighing the supplier’s 
performance capabilities. 
Cell 4 in the presence of a well established tour operator-accommodation establishment 
relationship where a tour operator level of dependence on the accommodation 
establishment is low, then the low tour operator’s dependence is said to increase 
accommodation establishment’s opportunism but at a much lower level. This means that a 
tour operator who has been highly dependent on accommodation establishment over the 
years is likely to perceive the latter as being subtly opportunistic over time. Following the 
foregoing discussions and reasoning we hypothesize that: 
H2 The association between buyer dependence and supplier opportunism is significantly 
reduced when the relationship duration increases. 
4.3.2.2.2 Buyer Transaction-Specific Investment, Purchase Volume and 
Supplier Opportunism 
 Buyer Transaction-Specific Investment (BUYSPEC) 
Extant literature on TCA describes transaction-specific investments as investments that are 
tailored to support a specific buyer-supplier relationship. These investments will lose value 
wholly or partially should they be redeployed into other alternatives (Buvik and Andersen, 
2002; Buvik and Reve, 2001). These idiosyncratic investments in an exchange relationship 
may create bonding or expropriation effect (Rokkan et al., 2003). The bonding effect 
occurs when the idiosyncratic investment creates value (Gosh and John, 1999) in an 
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exchange relationship by allowing the transacting parties to efficiently coordinate their 
activities and explore complementarities of the asset (Rokkan et al., 2003; Jap 1999; 
Williamson, 1996) thereby acting as the source of competitive advantage (Dyer and Sing, 
1998). On the other hand expropriation effect refers to vulnerabilities which are associated 
with asymmetrical specific investment by a focal investor which renders them susceptible 
to potential exploitation by the receiver (Rokkan et al., 2003; Williamson, 1985; Anderson, 
1988; Buvik and Reve 2002). However transaction-specific investment attenuates 
opportunistic behavior of the trading partners when there are bilateral credible 
commitments by both exchange partners (Rokkan et al., 2003). As Williamson (1985) puts 
it reciprocal investment leads to creation of mutually reliable relationship. 
In tour operator-accommodation establishment relationship, asymmetrical investment is 
observed where the tour operators have unilaterally adapted their billing routines to the 
specific order entry system of their major suppliers and specific investments in information 
technology dedicated to interactions with a particular supplier. These render them 
vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation by the receiver. However we argue that this 
association is weakened in the presence of large purchase volume of the tour operators. 
 Purchase Volume (PURCHVOL) 
The number of transactions and volume of purchase influence the firm’s efficacy as it 
demonstrates the importance of interfirm transactions in a buyer-seller relationship (Buvik 
and Grønhaug, 2000; Cai, Yang and Hu, 2010). In discrete transactions purchase volume 
tends to be overall small and thus its potency in attenuating opportunism is marginal. This 
is particularly the case when small tour operators with low bargaining power/low structural 
power interact with big accommodation establishments who possess high bargaining 
power/structural power. The problem in such interactions is safeguarding specific assets 
for the weak actor with low bargaining power/structural power (Buvik and Reve 2002). 
However when tour operator’s volume of purchase increases in the course of transacting 
repeatedly with their most important supplier, they become integrated with the supplier 
(Cai et al., 2010) partly on the strength of recurrent transactions, and by and large on the 
strength of mutual dependence (Heide, 1994) that arises from the high volume of purchase 
a tour operator brings in, and the amount of bednights that particular tour operator secures 
from the specific accommodation establishment. This has an economic implication as 
pointed out by Cai et al., (2010), large puchase volume that is concentrated on one 
particular seller enables the same to reduce transaction costs relating to searching and 
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selling to new customers. Nonetheless negotiation, contracting, monotoring and conflict 
resolution costs associated with engagements with other firms in the open market are done 
away with (Cai et al., 2010; D’Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994). Most importantly 
concentration of purchase/orders by the tour operator on a specific accommodation 
establishment promotes relational norms and cooperation between them thus exchange 
hazards associated with opportunistic behaviour (Heide, 1994) of exchange partners in 
particular accommodation establishment are attenuated. 
Certainly, the high volume of purchase signifies a greater cost of terminating the exchange 
relationship (Cai et al., 2010; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995) thus the tour operator gains 
a substantial bargaining power relative to accommodation establishment because of a 
significant amount of business they bring in to the latter. The source of power stems from 
the ability of the tour operators to award additional business, and coercion of cancelling or 
reducing the amount of subsequent business (Cai et al., 2010) they bring in to a specific 
accommodation establishment. Notwithstanding this however, accommodation 
establishments may behave opportunistically towards tour operators with small annual 
purchase volume than towards big tour operators. Accordingly this situation may even 
worsen in the presence of asymmetrical transaction-specific investment of the tour 
operators. Moreover, Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) argue that, concentration of 
purchase volume increases transaction frequency which in turn enables transacting parties 
to safeguard exchange relationship effectively. In this regard the volume of purchase of the 
tour operators acts as a deterrent towards suppliers’ opportunism. Specifically, guarantee 
of future volumes and cashinflows from buyers may enable the suppliers to reduce cost 
and improve quality (Handfield and Bechtel, 2002). 
The presence of unilateral buyer transaction-specific investment may open a door for some 
kind of opportunism, however such opportunism is counterpowered by large purchase 
volume. The high volume of purchase by a specific tour operator signifies his importance 
as a customer and it translates into their size and consequently their bargaining power. 
Figure 4.4 below further illustrates the foregoing reasoning. 
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Figure 4.4: Matrix of Tour operators’ Purchase Volume, Tour Operators’ Transaction-
Specific Investment and Accommodation Establishments’ Opportunism 
 
In the first column, Cell 1 and Cell 3, demonstrate a situation when a small tour operator 
with small volume of purchase adapts a unilateral transaction-specific investment with a 
specific accommodation establishment, the latter’s opportunism is said to increase at a 
much higher rate. That is when a small tour operator’s unilateral transaction-specific 
investment moves from low to high degree ,the accommodation establishment’s 
opportunism becomes very high because unilateral buyer transaction-specific investment 
locks in the buyer with the specific supplier (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Williamson 1985) 
thus creating dependence trap and increasing tour operator’s switching cost which enforces 
accommodation establishment’s opportunism because the tour operator cannot respond or 
make a credible threat (Wang et al., 2013). 
In the second column, Cell 2 and Cell 4, illustrate a situation when a big tour operator’s 
unilateral transaction-specific investment moves from low to high, accommodation 
establishment’s opportunism is said to increase at a much lower level. That is; the latter’s 
opportunism moves from very low to low degree. This is explained by the importance of 
volume of purchase a big tour operator brings in and the consequences of losing them 
should accommodation establishment behave opportunistically (Cai et al., 2010; Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995). The larger volume of purchase of a tour operator acts as a 
counter power against accommodation establishment’s opportunism (Buvik and Grønhaug, 
2000; Cai et al., 2010). Nonetheless as big tour operators bring in a lot of business to 
accommodation establishment they facilitate recurrent transactions which breed up 
relational norms between the exchange partners (Cai et al., 2010) as they do business 
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repeatedly they cultivate good inter-firm relationship, thus enhancing mutual 
understanding and joint action between them (Heide, 2003; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 
1995). This consequently deters opportunistic tendencies on the part of accommodation 
establishment. 
Besides, high purchase volume reflects relative dependence on the part of accommodation 
establishment and increased bargaining power on the part of the tour operator (Buvik and 
Reve 2002). Thus increased tour operator’s transaction-specific investment in the 
relationship with accommodation establishment actually dissipates the latter’s opportunism 
due to mutual dependence (Heide, 1994) where the formers volume of purchase is 
substantial. Following this reasoning this study hypothesizes that: 
H3 The association between buyer-held transaction-specific investment and supplier 
opportunism is significantly lowered when the purchasing volume increases. 
4.3.3 Control Variable 
4.3.2.3.1 Annual Accommodation Needs (ACNEED) 
The percentage of total annual accommodation needs of tour operators has a serious 
implication on the extent to which tour operators depend on accommodation 
establishments. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) put it “concentration of the control of 
discretion over resources and importance of focal organization’s resources to the 
organization together determine the focal organization’s dependence on any given other 
group of organization”. This means that since tour operators do not own their own 
accommodation facilities, they invariably have to acquire rooms from accommodation 
establishments should they thrive in their business. We argue that the extent to which the 
tour operators exercise control over properties of accommodation establishments is low, 
given the fact that a single supplier of accommodation services serves an endless number 
of tour operators. The high necessity of accommodation service by tour operators and low 
control of the same render them susceptible to accommodation establishment’s 
opportunism. Thus high percentage of annual accommodation needs of tour operators is 
positively associated with accommodation establishment’s opportunism. 
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4.4 Summary 
An overview of the research model and hypotheses has been presented in this chapter. 
Literature review on resource dependence theory (RDT), relational contracting theory 
(RCT) and transaction cost analysis (TCA) and discussions in the preceding chapters were 
used to develop research model and formulate hypotheses herein. Three hypotheses one of 
which represents the hypothesized main effect and the other two interaction effects, have 
been developed from the research model. Discussion on control variables has also been 
presented. Research methodology applied in this study is presented and discussed in depth 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodological aspects partinent to this study. In particular it 
gives an overview of the research design and data collection methods. It also presents and 
discusses sampling procedures and survey instrument development. Moreover, it presents 
and describes data collection techniques and procedures adopted in this study. 
5.2 Research Design 
Burns and Grove (2003), define research design as a blueprint for conducting a study with 
maximum control over factors that may interfere with the validity of the findings. 
Moreover, Creswell, (2014), defines research design as being a kind of enquiry within 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches that provide a specific direction 
for procedures in a research study. Extant literature classifies research design into several 
categories depending on the fundamental purpose of research (Cresswell, 2014; Malhotra 
and Birks, 2006; Churchil and Brown, 2004). According to Churchil and Brown (2004), 
research design can either be descriptive, exploratory, or causal and effects designs. While 
descriptive design focuses on determining the frequency upon which something occurs or 
the relationship between two variables, the exploratory design deals with discovering of 
new ideas and insights concerning the nature of the problem of phenomenal of interest. 
The causal design on the other hand is concerned with establishing the cause-and-effect 
relationships (Churchil and Brown, 2004). 
Malhotra and Birks (2006) further suggest that descriptive research can either be cross-
sectional or longitudinal. According to these authors, cross-sectional research concerns 
data collection from any given sample of population elements only once, whereas 
longitudinal research uses a fixed sample of population and measures them repeatedly.  
This study adopted some qualitative aspects as well as quantitative aspects of research 
design. Qualitative aspects were adopted at the preliminary stages where the authors had to 
conduct face-to-face interview with a few key informants in the tourism industry. Both 
representatives from accommodation establishments and tour operators were sought in 
order to tap more insight into the research problem at hand. Furthermore the information 
gathered from such discussions with key informants enabled the authors to develop 
question items that reflect the industry’s current practice. On the other hand quantitative 
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aspects which fall under cross-sectional design inform the main research design of this 
study. As Malhotra and Birks (2006) put it, cross-sectional design is appropriate in 
establishing the degree of association between variables and that it falls under descriptive 
and conclusive research designs. Thus this study has adopted cross-sctional, correlational 
design in order to test association between independent variables and dependent variable 
as seen in Figure 4.1 in the preceding chapter. 
5.3 Data Collection 
In order to test hypotheses in this study and scientifically address the research problem, 
this study has made use of primary and secondary data. The former represents data 
collection techniques where data is gathered firsthand from the field by the researcher 
himself. The latter kind represents data that is collected from already existing published 
reports through desk reviews. Thus primary data has been collected through questionnaires 
that the authors of this thesis administered in person. A randomly selected sample of tour 
operators was approached, and requested to fill out the questionnaires used in this study. 
As Churchil and Brown (2004), point out a questionnaire may be administered by mail, on 
the telephone, faxed or even in person. 
Secondary data played a critical role in this study as it formed a stepping stone towards 
establishing theoretical framework and conceptual model utilized herein. It has been an 
important corner stone for gaining insight into relevant theoretical and conceptual 
groundings as well as studying the nature of tourism industry in Tanzania. In this regard 
secondary data was gathered through literary sources such as: books; scholarly journal 
articles; conference papers; theses; documents and reports from Ministry of Tourism and 
Natural Resources, tourism associations like TATO, TCT, and HAT; World Bank; United 
Nations; National Bureau of statistics and other web-based sources. These sources have 
been used to corroborate empirical findings as well as developing theoretical framework 
for this study. 
5.3.1 Population, Sampling Frame, Sample Size and Sampling Procedures 
Churchil and Brown (2004), define population as the totality of cases that conform to some 
designated specifications. Nonetheless population parameters may be obtained by 
conducting a census –complete enumeration of population’s parameters or by taking a 
sample –a subset of the population. In this regard Churchil and Brown (2004) suggest five 
steps in sampling design. These are: (a) definition of the population in question; (b) 
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selection of the sampling frame; (c) selection of sampling procedures; (d) choosing the 
sample size; and (e) selection of sample elements. 
The population in this study consists of all registered and licensed tour operators on 
Tanzania mainland. A report obtained from Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
revealed that there were 384 licensed tour operators (MNRT, 2014). Majority of these tour 
operators are based in Arusha region which is one of the country’ major tourist destination, 
Dar Es Salaam is the second region with large concentration of tour operators, otherwise 
the tour operators are scattered all over the country. 
 Sampling Frame 
Churchil and Brown (2004) define a sampling frame as a list of all population elements 
from which a sample is drawn. Thus in this study the sampling frame consisted a list of 
291 registered and licenced tour operators (MNRT, 2014), who are based in Arusha and 
Dar Es Salaam Regions in the United Republic of Tanzania. 
Moreover, extant literature informs two kinds of sampling procedures; probability 
sampling and non-probability sampling procedures (Churchil and Brown, 2004). While in 
the former technique the underlaying assumption is that, each member of the target 
population has a non-zero chance of being included in the sample, the latter technique 
assumes that each element’s probability in the target population is unknown (Churchil and 
Brown, 2004). 
On the one hand, probability sampling technique is further broken down into four 
components: simple random sampling; stratified random sampling; systematic random 
sampling; and cluster sampling. On the other hand, non-probability sampling technique 
falls into: convenience sampling; judgmental sampling; and quota sampling (Churchil and 
Brown, 2004). Thus, this study employed a simple random sampling technique in selecting 
representative sample from the sampling frame of 291 tour operators. 
 Sample Size 
This study used a randomly selected sample of tour operators, with focus on two regions 
which have major concentrations of tour operating companies, Arusha and Dar Es Salaam 
regions. However extant literature does not give a clear description on the common 
consensus as to appropriate sample sizes. Scholars like Hussey and Hussey (1997) point 
out that, there is no ideal or prescribed sample size and that it all depends on the discipline, 
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the level of confidence expected in the answers, and the anticipated response rate. For 
instance while Schumaker and Lomax (2004) suggest a reasonable sample of at least 100 
elements when using the structural equation model (SEM), Hair et al., (2006) suggest a 
sample size spanning from 100-150 elements. Lawley and Maxwell, (1971) suggest that a 
sample should have a ratio of five observation per construct. Hair et al., (2010) suggest a 
prefarably sample size of 10:1 ratio as acceptable to factor analyse. Nonetheless a rule of 
thumb exists for calculating a sample size in the multiple regression analysis: 
(a) Cases to independent variables ratio; N>50+8m (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2007) 
(b) For testing predictor variables; N>104+m (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2007). Where N 
represents sample size; and m represents number of independent variables. 
This study has a total number of six independent variables, thus the minimum sample 
based on criterion (a) is 50+8*6 = 98. Nonetheless we targeted a total of 100 respondents 
to foster adequate representative responses that are factor analysable. 
5.3.2 Questionnaire Development and Data Collection Techniques 
 Questionnaire Development 
By and large all latent constructs and their corresponding constituent measurement 
variables were developed on the basis of a rigorous and extensive literature review. 
Moreover, the survey instrument development process also incorporated inputs from the 
supervisor –as an experienced researcher and target respondents (tour operators). Critique 
from the experienced researcher was sought after to ensure adequacy, clarity, and 
completeness of measurement variables as recommended by (De Villis, 2003; Dillman, 
1978). Furthermore, in order to tap tourism industry’s domain, face-to-face interviews 
were conducted in the exploratory phase where interview guide was used to gather 
preliminary information. The aim was to gain an understanding of the industry and clarify 
the nature of the research problem. The face-to-face interviews enabled the authors to 
pinpoint relevant variables that are partinent to this study. Further to this it afforded this 
study to adapt similar constructs used in previous researches to the research problem at 
hand to fit the context of Tanzania’s tourism industry. 
Prior to data collection exercise, the questionnaire was pre-tested for content validity 
(Chen, Paulraj and Lado, 2004). Respondents were approached and requested to pre-
review the questionnaire’s structure, readability, ambiguity, and completness as 
recommended by Dillman, (1978). These respondents who were actually managers in their 
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respective companies provided valuable information that enhanced further improvements 
on ambiguous and inappropriate vocabulary as recommended by Hunt, Sparkman, and 
Wilcox (1982) which enabled us to fine-tune the survey instrument accordingly. Lastly, 
the final questionnaire was developed by incorporating feedbacks from experienced 
researcher and practitioners. The instrument was in English language (see Appendix 1). 
Respondents were requested to grade all items using a 7-point likert scale, anchored from 
1-‘strongly disagree, to 7-‘strongly agree’, with regard to one of their most important 
suppliers of accommodation services. 
The survey instrument consisted of three main parts. Part 1 sought to gather background 
information on the respondents and their major suppliers. Part 2 had multi-item, seven 
point likert scale anchored from 1-strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree which sought to 
measure the relevant constructs in this study. Part 3 had single-item measures as well as 
general questions both open-ended and closed-ended designed to capture the various 
aspects of tour operator-accommodation establishment’s dyadic relationship. 
 Data Collection Procedures and Techniques 
This study adopted a key informant technique to collect data as suggested by (Seidler 
1974). The exploratory study revealed that tour consultants, operations managers, general 
managers, owners and marketing managers deal with day-to-day operation management 
responsibilities. These individuals were knowledgeable about the relationship between the 
focal firm (tour operator) and partner firms (accommodation establishments) and thus well 
qualified to be key informants. 
Data collection for this study was conducted through survey with questionnaire being the 
main tool. As Churchill (1999) suggests a questionnaire can be administered by mail, 
telephone or in person through face-to-face interview. In this study questionnaires were 
administered in person through face-to-face interviews. The choice of this technique 
stemmed from the fact that Tanzania like many African nations has underdeveloped 
information system infrastructure thus the administration of questionnaires by mail would 
likely result into very low response rate. Moreover, administration of questionnaires 
through telephone was out of the question due to high costs associated with the process 
given the fact that the questionnaire had 54 questions. The length of the questionnaire and 
associated costs rendered telephone interviews inconvenient as it would likely have 
resulted into a very low response rate. 
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The authors of this study visited individual tour operators from the period of 19 January 
2015 through 27 February 2015. We then held face-to-face interviews with either the 
owners, managers (marketing and operations) or tour consultants whom we believed had 
sufficient knowledge and experience on the relationship with their most important 
suppliers of accommodation services. Nonetheless any one among the aforementioned 
informants assisted in the filling out of the questionnaires based on their availability at the 
time of visiting notwithstanding the fact that we established contact with key informants a 
priori. 
 Response Rate 
The informants were requested to identify one of thier most important suppliers of 
accommodation services and then relate all the subsequent questions to the relationship 
with this specific accommodation establishment (see Appendix 1). The response rate for 
this study was 81%, as we were able to collect 81 responses out of 100 that we targeted in 
the first place. Such a high response rate was afforded by personal interview which we 
embraced in this study. As pointed out early on, face-to-face interview is renowned to 
yield a high response rate (Malhotra and Birks, 2006). 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter the methodology used in this study has been presented and discussed. 
Cross-sectional quantitative design has been delineated as the main research strategy in 
this study. Furthermore thorough discussions on questionnaire development, data 
collection procedures and techniques have also been presented. The next chapter presents 
descriptions and operationalizations of the primary latent constructs used in this study. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DEFINITIONS AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a measurement model adapted in this study. It follows that different 
constructs are defined and their respective measures delineated. All perceptual items are 
operationalized on a 7-point likert scale while non-perceptual items are measured using 
single item scale. Nonetheless all measurement items have been adapted from previous 
research works and modified accordingly to fit the context of this work. 
6.2 Measurement 
Measurement entails the assignment of numerals to objects according to established rules 
(Kerlinger, 1986). Thus this study operationalized all constructs based on the 
recommendations from Churchill (1979), which set out guidelines for designing measures 
of constructs used in a study. Reflecting on such recommendations, this study carried out 
extensive literature review to capture the domain of the constructs used to formulate 
hypotheses herein. Nonetheless, measurement items from previous research were adapted 
and modified to fit the context of this study. Specifically, multi-item scales were used to 
operationalize all the constructs except for percentge of annual accommodation needs, 
relationship duration, and annual purchase volume which were operationalized using 
single item scales. Peter (1979) posits that, multi-item scale allows measurement errors to 
scale out against each other, thus increasing scale reliability because they are much more 
rigorous in capturing construct’s domain than is the case with single item scales (Grover 
and Malhotra, 2003). As De Vellis, (2003) points out, poor measurement may undermine 
the validity of conclusion on a research; it is therefore advisable that measurement process 
be carried out well from start of research in order to foster a better research conclusion. 
Unlike multi-item scales, all single items scales will not be subjected to validity tests as 
they are ratio scales (Buvik and Haughland, 2005; Rokkan et al., 2003; Buvik and 
Grønhaugh, 2000). 
6.3 Measurement Model 
Extant literature informs two kinds of measurement models; reflective and formative 
models (Hair et al., 2010; Bollen and Lenox, 1991; Jarvis, Mackenzie and Podsakoff, 
2003). According to Bollen (1989), reflective measurement model represents construct’s 
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manifestations or reflections in such a way that variations in the construct itself result into 
variation in its measures. Meanwhile Hair et al., (2010) contend that reflective 
measurement model is based on the notion that measurement variables are caused by the 
latent construct, and that measurement error stems from latent construct’s inability to fully 
explain the measurement variables (Hair et al., 2010). On the contrary formative measures 
represent causal measurement model and are not considered latent but rather indices where 
each indicator is a cause of the construct (Hair et al., 2010), moreover, variables are 
viewed as causes of constructs whereby the construct is created or influenced by its 
measures (Hair et al., 2010; Fornell and Bookstein, 1982). However in order to measure a 
latent construct, Jarvis et al., (2003) proposes the use of either reflective or formative 
measurement models as both models make use of multiple indicators. 
Furhermore, in the reflective measurement model the direction of causality starts from 
construct to measures while in the formative measure the direction of causality is from 
measures to construct (Jarvis et al., 2003). Nonetheless in reflective model, possible 
correlations among the observed measures are due to construct. This ensures reliability as 
measures are expected to portray internal consistency. On the contrary, in formative 
measurement model internal consistency is not expected, for the direction of causality starts 
from item to construct thus the model demands criterion reliability and it accounts for error 
at the construct level (Jarvis et al., 2003) (see Figure 6.1). Thus, this study has 
operationalized all constructs as latent variables where all variables have been measured as 
reflective scales (see Appendix 3). 
Figure 6.1: Measurement Models: (a) Reflective Model; and (b) Formative Model 
 
Source: Bollen and Lenox (1991) 
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6.4 Measurement Process  
In this section each variable is defined and all question items that make up a particular 
latent construct are listed. This study has one dependent variable; supplier opportunism 
(OPPORT) and five independent variables: purchase volume (PURCHVOL), buyer 
dependence (BUYDEP), trust (TRUST), relationship duration (DURAT), buyer 
transaction-specfic investment (BUYSPEC); and one control variable; percentage of 
annual accommodation needs (ACNEED). 
6.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
 Supplier Opportunism (OPPORT) 
Supplier opportunism is used as the dependent variable, which is influenced by the 
aforementioned independent variables. Question items constituting this latent construct 
were adapted from previous studies by Rokkan et al., (2003); Gundlach, Achrol and 
Mentzer (1995); and Provan and Skinner (1989). The construct is made up of eight items 
which are anchored from ‘‘1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree.’’ Thus the following 
items have been used to measure supplier’s opportunism as perceived by the buyer. 
OPPORT 1  This supplier sometimes makes false promises regarding the availability 
of rooms by issuing service voucher beyond its actual capacity of 
bednights 
OPPORT 2  This supplier sometimes disguises its efforts to improve on its service 
standards 
OPPORT 3  Occasionaly, this supplier is unwilling to accept responsibilities regarding 
waiving cancellations of our bookings 
OPPORT 4  Sometimes this supplier expects us to pay for more than our fair share of 
the costs 
OPPORT 5  This supplier occasionally makes false accusation regarding failure to 
check in our clients 
OPPORT 6  Sometimes this supplier fails to provide proper notification in time 
regarding last minute outbooking of our clients to alternative 
accommodation 
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OPPORT 7  This supplier sometimes uses unexpected events to extract extra payment 
from our company 
OPPORT 8  Occasionally as the result of overbooking situation this supplier outbooks 
our clients to another accommodation facility without upgrading it as 
stated in our formal and informal agreements 
6.4.2 The Independent Variables 
 Trust (TRUST) 
Trust as a latent construct was measured using a 7-point likert scale, anchored from ‘‘1= 
strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree.’’ This construct is made up of nine items adapted 
from Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995); Morgan and Hunt (1994); Moorman et al., 
(1992); and Ganesan (1994). 
TRUST 1  This supplier considers our well-being when making important decisions 
on block allocation 
TRUST 2  This supplier fulfils promises it makes to our company regarding 
bookings and reservations 
TRUST 3  We trust that this supplier follows guidelines stated in our formal 
agreements 
TRUST 4  The conflicts resolution with this supplier extends to informal agreements 
(gentlemen’s agreements) 
TRUST 5  This supplier is a friend because of his truthfulness 
TRUST 6  I trust in this supplier that his future decisions and actions will not 
adversely affect my company 
TRUST 7  This supplier has high levels of integrity and honesty with regard to my 
company’s business dealings 
TRUST 8  This supplier always keeps the promises it makes to our company 
TRUST 9  This supplier considers our welfare when making important decisions 
such as extension of release period 
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 Buyer Dependence (BUYDEP) 
This construct is adapted from previous research work by Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 
(1998) and Heide (1994), and is made up of six items which are anchored on a 7-point 
likert scale from ‘‘1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree.’’ 
BUYDEP 1  There are many competitive suppliers offering similar accommodation 
services as this supplier 
BUYDEP 2  Our company is very dependent on this supplier because of its high level 
of service standards 
BUYDEP 3  Our company is very dependent on this supplier due to its high 
availability of bednights 
BUYDEP 4  It would be very difficult to replace bednights our company secures from 
this supplier 
BUYDEP 5  This supplier offers our company very favourable rates 
BUYDEP 6  It will cost us significant amount of money and time if the relationship 
with this supplier should be terminated and replaced with other suppliers 
 Buyer Transaction-Specific Investment (BUYSPEC) 
This construct is made up of six items which are anchored from ‘‘1= strongly disagree to 
7= strongly agree.’’ The measurement items were adapted from previous research work by 
Anderson and Weitz (1992); Buvik and Haugland (2005); and Rokkan et al., (2003). 
BUYSPEC 1  In order to secure allotment of rooms from this supplier, our company 
places a substantial downpayment in advance 
BUYSPEC 2  Our company has developed specialized order entry routines adapted to 
this supplier 
BUYSPEC 3  We have adapted our billing routines to the specific order entry system of 
this supplier 
BUYSPEC 4  Our company has invested in quality assurance program required by this 
supplier to ensure that it meets our required service standards 
BUYSPEC 5  Our company has made significant investment in information technology 
dedicated to the interactions with this supplier 
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BUYSPEC 6  If our company switched to a competitor of this supplier we would lose a 
significant part of invenstment that we have made for adapting to this 
supplier 
 Percentage of Total Annual Accommodation Needs (ACNEED) 
This construct represents concentration of exchange. It is operationalized as a single item 
scale adapted from previous research work by Rokkan et al., (2003). The construct is 
measured by a single open-ended question: 
What percentage (0%-100%) of your company’s total annual accommodation service 
needs is provided by this supplier?                  %. 
 Relationship Duration (DURAT) 
Relationship duration represents the number of years that a particular tour operator has 
been buying accommodation services from its most important supplier. This construct was 
adapted from Heide and Miner (1992); and Buvik and Andersen (2002) and has been 
operationalized by computing the natural logarithm of the actual duration in years. The 
construct is measured by a single open-ended question: 
How long have you been doing business with this supplier?            Years 
 Annual Purchase Volume (PURCHVOL) 
Purchase Volume was operationalized as a single item scale. The construct was adapted 
from previous research by Buvik and Grønhaug (1999); and Buvik and Haugland (2005). 
This construct was measured as a natural logarithm of the total annual dollar value 
expended by a particular tour operator in buying accommodation services from its most 
important supplier. The construct is measured by single open question: 
How much in terms of monetary value did your company buy from this supplier during the 
last year?                  US$ 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter each construct was defined and its respective measures delineated. 
Nonetheless operationalization and measurement of variables were discussed. Evaluation 
of measurement models was made and question items for both independent and dependent 
variables were presented. In the next chapter reliability and validity tests are presented and 
thoroughly discussed.  
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CHAPTER 7 
MEASUREMENTS ASSESSMENT AND DATA VALIDATION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an assessment of data quality and validation of the same for further 
analysis. Descriptive statistics are run to see to it that the parametric assumptions of 
regression analysis are met. Specifically descriptives are run to determine linearity, and 
normality of the data. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses are performed and 
scale validity and reliability tests are presented. 
7.2 Data Screening and Cleaning 
7.2.1 Assessment of Missing Data 
The first action we performed was identifying any missing data in the data set. In this 
study in the 81 questionnaires we collected, there has not been any missing data. This is 
attributable to the data collection technique we adopted in the first place –administering 
the questionnaire in person, in a one-on-one interview style. This enabled us to ensure all 
question items were filled out before parting with the respondents. 
7.2.2 Assessment of Outliers, Skewness and Kurtosis for Normality Check 
We went on to check for the presence of outliers in the data set. According to Kline 
(2011), outliers are scores that are different from others in a data set. They are observations 
with extreme value on either one variable –univariate outliers or an unusual combination 
of scores on two or more variables –multivariate outliers which distort statistics 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). There is not a common consensus as to the definition of 
extreme observation however the rule of thumb is that any observation with scores more 
than three standard deviations from the mean are considered as being outliers (Kline, 
2011). Furthermore Kline 2011 suggests that if the outlier(s) is to be retained then it has to 
be converted to a value that equals the next most extreme score falling within three 
standard deviation of mean. Another alternative is to transform mathematically a variable 
with outliers (Kline, 2011). Hair et al., (2010) suggest that, either dependent or 
independent variables or both can be transformed mathematically so that the variables 
become more suitable to portraying the relationship. 
As a rule of thumb, for small samples with 80 or fewer observations, outliers typically are 
defined as cases with standard scores of 2.5 or greater (Hair et al., 2010). Thus in this 
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study data screening and cleaning were done in light of the suggestions by Kline (2011) 
and Hair et al., (2010). We normalized the perceptual observations in all reflective 
measures by winsorizing extreme observations to the value that equalled the next extreme 
observation that fell within three standard deviations of the mean. Outliers with actual 
values such as duration of relationship which ranged between 3 and 33 years; and purchase 
volume which ranged between US$ 8,000 and 12,000,000 were transformed 
mathematically into natural logarithm to ensure normality (Kline, 2011; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). The transformations resulted into scores ranging between 1.10 and 3.50 for 
DURAT; and between 8.99 and 16.30 for PURCHVOL. 
We also assessed all observations for skewness and kurtosis. Based on the rigorous data 
cleaning steps we undertook in light of recommendations from Kline (2011) and Hair et 
al., (2010). All observations fall within the acceptable range i.e. within ±3 standard 
deviations of the mean for skewness indices and within 10 for kurtosis indices (Kline 
2011). See Appendix 2. 
7.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Gaur and Guar (2006), describe descriptive statistics as numerical and graphical methods 
used to describe and summarize statistical data Descriptive statistics are used to analyze 
the characteristics of a sample and assess variables for potential violation of assumptions 
that guide statistical techniques undertaken in a study (Glavee-Geo, 2012). Specifically, 
Pallant (2007) suggests that it is imperative to subject a data set to descriptive analysis 
before further validation or analyses are performed. Accordingly the numerical method 
includes: measures of central tendency such as mean, median, and mode and normality; 
measures of variability such as variance, standard deviation and range; and measures of 
skewness and kurtosis. Thus the descriptive statistics in this study as presented in Tables 
7.1 and 7.2 below have been computed after controlling for outliers as described in the 
preceding subsection on data screening and cleaning. 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Characteristics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DURAT 81 3 33 10.91 6.440 
PURCHVOL 81 8000 12000000 880103 1809961 
ACNEED 81 12 90 51.15 18.03 
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Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics of Constructs 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
OPPORT 81 1.00 4.75 2.57 0.97 
TRUST 81 3.17 7.00 5.56 0.97 
BUYDEP 81 2.00 6.67 4.63 0.99 
BUYSPEC 81 1.00 4.00 1.44 0.72 
DURAT 81 1.10 3.50 2.24 0.56 
PURCHVOL 81 8.99 16.30 12.38 1.66 
ACNEED 81 12.00 90.00 51.15 18.03 
BUYDEP x DURAT 81 4.03 21.54 10.42 3.74 
BUYSPEC x PURCHVOL 81 9.39 50.13 17.80 9.02 
7.4 Scale Reliability 
Reliability refers to whether scores to items on an instrument are internally consistent in 
terms of their responses across constructs, stability over time, and whether there was 
consistency in test administration and scoring (Creswell, 2014). It is an extent to which 
multiple measurements of a variable or a set of variables are consistent in terms of what 
they are designed to measure (Hair et al., 2010). Extant literature informs different 
methods of assessing constuct reliability such as: test-retest –which measures consistency 
between responses at two points in time, to ensure that they are not varied across time 
periods hence their reliability (Hair et al., 2010); internal consistency –which entails the 
use of Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951), commonly used to assess reliability of 
variables in a summated scale (Hair et al., 2010). 
Cronbach alpha values range between 0 and 1 with values close to 1 indicating greater 
reliability (Pallant, 2011). However the use of Cronbach alpha is criticized (Henseler, 
Ringle and Sinkovics, 2009; Hattie, 1985), for it is highly influenced by the number of 
variables constituting a summated scale –as the number of observed variables goes up so 
does the reliability (Hair et al., 2010) and therefore it is biased (Chen et al., 2005). 
Considering the short fall associated with using Cronbach alpha Hair et al., (2010) clearly 
point out that there is not a single item that perfectly measures a concept and therefore it is 
imperative to rely on a series of diagonstics to assess internal consistency. 
Notwithstanding this criticism, this study has made use of Cronbach alpha to assess 
internal consistency of variables hence reliability of constructs as recommeded by Pallant 
(2011). Furthermore composite reliability has also been computed per recommendations 
laid down by Hair et al., (2010) with an intention of providing a more robust evidence of 
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constructs’ reliability. Table 7.3 presents reliability statistics which have been derived 
from EFA and CFA where all significant items-total correlations were used to compute 
Cronbach alpha for summated scale of each construct, meanwhile significant factor 
loadings were used to compute composite reliability for each construct likewise. Otherwise 
all scale items with cross loadings and factor loading below 0.40 criterion threshold were 
left out from futher analysis. 
Table 7.3: Construct Reliability Scores 
Construct Items 
No. of 
items 
Cronbach 
alpha (α) 
Composite 
reliability 
OPPORT OPPORT 4,5,7,8 4 .638 0.640 
TRUST TRUST 2,3,4,5,6,7 6 .901 0.910 
BUYSPEC BUYSPEC 3,4,5,6 4 .811 0.829 
BUYDEP BUYDEP 3 4,6 3 .574 0.581 
As depicted in table 7.3 above the Cronbach alpha for TRUST and BUYSPEC constructs 
are way above the recommended criterion threshold of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2010; Nunnally, 
1967) however the Cronbach alpha for OPPORT and BUYDEP constructs are slightly 
below this recommended criterion threshold i.e. 0.64 and 0.57 are < 0.70. Notwithstanding 
this, these constructs’ Cronbach alpha are within acceptable threshold as recommended by 
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) and Yenidogan (2011), that is all of the scales have 
Cronbach alpha greater than 0.50. In addition reliability coefficients below 0.70 criterion 
threshold are not uncommon in the extant literature. It is evident that previous studies have 
also used reliability threshold below 0.7 (Buvik and John, 2000; Chen, Paulraj and Lado, 
2004). Therefore the data collection instrument is satisfactorily reliable (Pallant, 2011) on 
the strength of the high internal consistency of the measurement instrument. 
7.5 Validity 
Validity is the degree to which the evidence that supports the interpretations of data is 
correct and the manner in which interpretations used are appropriate (Moskal, Leydens and 
Pavelich, 2002). It is the extent to which measurement scale correctly represents the 
concept of study (Hair et al., 2010). According to Hair et al., (2010) several forms of 
validity are known to exist: construct, convergent, discriminant and face validity. We take 
turns to explain these concepts. 
 Construct validity: refers to the extent to which observed variables accurately 
represent the theoretical unobserved construct the variables are designed to capture 
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in the first place (Hair et al., 2010; Churchill, 1979). This means that the constructs 
tap the theoretical abstraction. 
 Convergent validity: is an extent to which a set of observed variables which 
represent a theoretical latent construct share the highest proportion of variance in 
common (Hair et al., 2010; Churchill, 1979). This means that observed variables 
representing a single factor are highly correlated. 
 Discriminant validity: is the extent to which observed variables uniquely represent 
a single common latent construct which is truly distinct from all other latent 
constructs in terms of how it correlates with other constructs in the model (Hair et 
al., 2010; Churchill, 1979). That is latent constructs are distict from each other and 
uncorrelated and that variables which measure individual latent construct highly 
correspond with this construct and not the other constructs. 
 Face validity: refers to the extent to which the content of observed variables is 
coherent with the definition of the latent construct based on researcher’s own 
judgement (Hair et al., 2010). 
7.5.1 Construct Validity 
Shuttleworth (2009) and Churchill (1979) suggest that construct validity be established by 
investigating convergent and discriminant validity. As Dunn, Seaker and Waller (1994) 
posit, both convergent and discriminant validity are robust in capturing the domain of 
construct validity. Specifically, all measures used in this study were adapted from previous 
research; however they were modified to fit the context of the research problem at hand. 
Nonetheless, as pointed out early on, each construct in the questionnaire was developed by 
carefully incorporating inputs from experienced researcher and practitioners in the 
Tanzania’s tourism industry, thus meeting the requirement for establishing content validity 
(Hawkins, Pohlen and Prybutok, 2013). 
7.5.2 Discriminant Validity 
We performed EFA with varimax rotation on all perceptual measures to establish 
discriminant and convergent validity (Churchill 1979; Chen and Paulraj, 2004; Buvik and 
Haugland, 2005). Individual items with high factor loadings loaded onto factors which 
corresponded to the conceptualized constructs, this signifies the measures captured what 
they were intended to in the first place. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) 
was 0.78 –middling (Hair et al., 2010), indicating that inter-item correlations are explained 
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by common factors (Buvik and Haugland, 2005). The Bartlett’s test of sphericity is higly 
significant (B-test: 622.9; p = 0.00) that is Chi-square value of 622.9 at the degree of 
freedom 136 and significant at p < 0.05. This indicates that the data are factor analyzable. 
Table 7.4: Exploratory Factor Analysis (n=81) 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
CONSTRUCTS 
FACTOR1 
TRUST 
FACTOR2 
BUYSPEC 
FACTOR3 
OPPORT 
FACTOR4 
BUYDEP 
TRUST2 .823 -.030 -.317 .099 
TRUST3 .848 .008 -.263 -.007 
TRUST4 .658 .089 -.093 -.163 
TRUST5 .839 -.278 -.156 -.024 
TRUST6 .796 -.350 .019 .160 
TRUST7 .833 -.186 -.077 .159 
BUYSPEC3 -.059 .745 -.033 .132 
BUYSPEC4 -.040 .842 .125 -.143 
BUYSPEC5 -.177 .841 .051 -.045 
BUYSPEC6 -.129 .741 .055 -.222 
OPPORT4 -.070 .137 .765 -.224 
OPPORT5 -.219 -.039 .576 .211 
OPPORT7 -.131 .037 .606 .212 
OPPORT8 -.175 .057 .681 -.041 
BUYDEP3 -.110 .133 -.175 .738 
BUYDEP4 .055 -.203 .331 .673 
BUYDEP6 .182 -.192 .091 .681 
Eigen value 5.09 2.63 1.71 1.43 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a
Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
Nonetheless EFA gives preliminary evidence of both convergent and discriminant validity 
portrayed in Table 7.4 above, as the loadings of measures of a single unique construct are 
greater than loadings of measures of different constructs. The result of EFA gives out a 
four-factor solution whose factor loadings range between 0.576 and 0.848 all of which are 
above 0.50 recommended criterion threshold (Hair et al., 2010), hence significant for all 
practical purposes. Nonetheless all items loading below 0.40 criterion threshold were 
disregarded for further analysis following the recommendations laid down by Pallant 
(2011). Thus the factor loadings of the 17 items accounted for 63.85 per cent of the total 
variance explained. 
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Furthermore we ran CFA in AMOS 22 and then computed the average variance extracted 
(AVE) from standardized factor loadings. We then compared the AVE with inter-item 
squared correlations as shown in Table 7.5 below. The average variance extracted (AVE)
3
 
was found to be higher than the squared multiple correlations (highest shared variance) 
among the different constructs in each case confirming Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) 
criterion for strong evidence of discriminant validity. 
Table 7.5: Discriminant Validity; Squared Inter-construct Correlation (R
2
) and Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. OPPORT 1 .13 .02 .02 .04 .11 .00 .01 .00 
2. TRUST  1 .01 .08 .11 .07 .01 .08 .05 
3. BUYDEP   1 .05 .02 .01 .08 .49 .04 
4. BUYSPEC    1 .05 .00 .00 .09 .93 
5. DURAT     1 .38 .11 .62 .01 
6. PURCHVOL      1 .05 .28 .04 
7. ACNEED       1 .15 .00 
8. BUYDEP x DURAT        1 .03 
9. BUYSPEC x PURCHVOL         1 
AVE .31 .63 .34 .55 - - - - - 
The results in Table 7.5 above depict AVE values ranging between 0.31 and 0.63, with 
trust (TRUST) and buyer specific investment (BUYSPEC) surpassing the recommended 
0.50 or above criterion threshold (Hair et al., 2010) while supplier opportunism (OPPORT) 
and buyer dependence (BUYDEP) falling behind the 0.50 criterion threshold at 0.31 and 
0.34 respectively. However Janssens et al., (2006) suggest that AVE values below 0.5 can 
still be accepted provided that the construct reliability is strong. Specifically Chen and 
Paulraj (2004) suggest that AVE values above 0.30 criterion threshold are acceptable. 
Hence the AVE values for these two constructs are satisfactory (Jansens et al., 2006; Chen 
and Paulraj, 2004) and therefore all the constructs in this study support discriminant 
validity. 
Notwithstanding the recommendations by Hair et al., (2010) that items with own loadings 
below 0.50 be dropped, we retained (BUYDEP3) whose loading was 0.30, far below this 
                                                 
3
 AVE = (Sum of squared standardized loadings)/[( Sum of squared standardized loadings ) + (Sum of 
indicator measurement error)]. 
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criterion threshold, however acceptable (Buvik and John, 2000). Furthermore it was 
necessary to retain this item for model identification in AMOS 22 and to maintain content 
validity of the construct –having items that adequately reflect the construct (Salema, 2014; 
Li et al., 2005). 
7.5.3 Convergent Validity 
Convergent validity has been deployed to assess the extent to which multiple indicators 
that were used to measure a construct correlate with each other. The preliminary findings 
in EFA as depicted in Table 7.5 above confirm the existence of convergent validity, as 
each construct’s Eigen value exceeds the criterion threshold of 1.0 (Chen and Paulraj, 
2004; Hair et al., 2010). The Eigen value for the factors ranged between 1.43 and 5.09. 
Furthermore the output of CFA as illustrated in Table 7.6 below reveals that, the factor 
loadings of observed variables for each latent construct are all significant; that is, t-values 
are > 2 (Chen and Pauraj, 2004; Hair et al., 2010). Nonetheless all own factor loadings are 
quite large and exceeded the recommended criterion threshold of 0.50, and thus 
confirming convergent validity (Hair et al., 2010; Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Yen and 
Hung, 2013; Tam, 2011) with an exception of a constituent variable in buyer dependence 
(BUYDEP3) whose own factor loading is way below this threshold. However, own factor 
loadings below this criterion threshold are not uncommon in the extant literature. For 
instance Buvik and John (2000) used 0.30 as a rule of thumb threshold for own factor 
loadings, Chen et al., (2004) recommend own factor loadings greater than 0.30. In this 
regard BUYDEP3 shows a marginally acceptable factor loading at 0.30. Nonetheless its t-
value is significant at (p < 0.05). 
On the other hand composite reliability (CR)
4
 for OPPORT, TRUST and BUYSPEC are 
well above 0.60 recommended criterion threshold (Yen and Hung, 2013; Bagozzi and Yi, 
1988) each 0.64, 0.91 and 0.83 respectively, with an exception of buyer dependence 
BUYDEP whose composite reliability is slightly below the recommended threshold thus 
demonstrating marginally acceptable CR of 0.58 which is evidently on the verge of the 
recommended criterion threshold of 0.60 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). It follows that the 
convergent validity is supported.  
                                                 
4
 Composite reliability (CR) = (Sum of standardized loadings)
2
/[( Sum of standardized loadings)
2
 + (Sum of 
indicator measurement error)]. 
It refers to the amount of variation a theoretical latent construct explains in 
the observed variables to which it is related (Hair et al., 2010). 
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Table 7.6: Measurement Model Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Results (n=81) 
Construct 
Factor loading 
(t–value)b 
  Seven-point likert-scale type-items with end points 
strongly disagree and strongly agree 
Supplier Opportunism 
OPPORT: 4 items 
X
2
(2) = 3.31, p = 0.19 
CFI = 0.96; IFI = 0.97 
RMSEA = 0.09 
α = 0.64; CR = 0.64 
0.588
a 
 OPPORT8: Occasionally as the result of overbooking situation 
this supplier outbooks our clients to another accommodation 
facility without upgrading it as stated in our formal and informal 
agreements 
0.514  (3.139)  OPPORT7: This supplier sometimes uses unexpected events to 
extract extra payment from our company 
0.562  (3.305)  OPPORT5: This supplier occasionally makes false accusation 
regarding failure to check in our clients 
0.554  (3.278)  OPPORT4: Sometimes this supplier expects us to pay for more 
than our fair share of the costs 
Trust 
TRUST: 6 items 
X
2
(9) = 42.63, p = 0.00 
CFI = 0.90; IFI = 0.90 
RMSEA = 0.22 
α = 0.90; CR = 0.91 
0.854
a 
 TRUST7: This supplier has high levels of integrity and honesty 
with regard to my company’s business dealings 
0.823  (9.164) 
 
TRUST6: I trust in this supplier that his future decisions and 
actions will not adversely affect my company 
0.862  (9.909) 
 
TRUST5: This supplier is a friend because of his truthfulness 
0.526  (4.960) 
 
TRUST4: The conflicts resolution with this supplier extends to 
agreements (gentlemen’s agreements) 
0.818  (9.081) 
 
TRUST3: We trust that this supplier  follows guidelines stated in 
our formal agreements 
0.836  (9.406) 
 
TRUST2: This supplier fulfils promises it makes to our 
company regarding bookings and reservations 
Buyer specific investment 
BUYSPEC:4 items 
X
2
(2) = 8.09, p = 0.02 
CFI = 0.95; IFI = 0.95 
RMSEA = 0.20 
α = 0.81; CR = 0.83 
 
0.731
a  BUYSPEC6: If our company switched to a competitor of this 
supplier we would lose a significant part of invenstment that we 
have made for adapting to this supplier 
0.848  (6.709) 
 
BUYSPEC5: Our company has made significant ivestment in 
information technology dedicated to the interactions with this 
supplier 
0.780  (6.384)  BUYSPEC4: Our company has invested in a quality assurance 
program required by  this supplier to ensure that it meets our 
required service standards 
0.591  (4.896)  BUYSPEC3: We have adapted our billing routines to the 
specific order entry system of this supplier 
Buyer dependence 
BUYDEP: 3 items 
CFI = 1.00; IFI = 1.00 
RMSEA = 0.30 
α = 0.57; CR = 0.58 
Trivial fit for three-item 
scale 
0.607
a 
 BUYDEP6: It will cost us significant amount of money and time 
if the relationship with this supplier should be terminated and 
replaced with other suppliers 
0.751  (2.844)  BUYDEP4: It would be very difficult to replace bednights our 
company secures from this supplier 
0.298  (2.060)  BUYDEP3: Our company is very dependent on this supplier due 
to its high availability of bednights 
a
Fixed variable. 
b
Standardized loadings significant at p < 0.05 
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7.6 Assessment of the Hypothesized Measurement Model 
We employed AMOS 22 to run CFA in order to assess how well our hypothesized model 
fits the data and ensure unidimensionality. The CFA results as depicted in Table 7.6 
confirm an adequate fit of our model to the data. All standardized loadings were significant 
at p < 0.05. Nonetheless each parameter behaved as expected with regard to their 
associations as reflected in their signs (refer to Appendix 3). The overall model indicates 
relatively adequate fit considering various fit statistics (Bollen and Long, 1993). We 
obtained a significant Chi-square statistic (X
2
 =161 d.f = 113, p = 0.02), the significant p-
value which indicates problems with the fit (Hair et al., 2010) results from the sensitivity 
of Chi-square to sample size (Kline, 2011; Bryne, 2010; Hair et al., 2010). However 
further assessment of the normed Chi-square ratio (CMIN/DF) provides a ratio of 1.4:1 far 
below the recommended criterion threshold of 3:1 (Hair et al., 2010). Moreover, a number 
smaller than 2.0 is considered very good (ibid.). Nonetheless other fit indices, CFI= 0.91, 
IFI = 0. 92 were all within the recommended criterion threshold of not less than 0.90 
(Bryne, 2010; Hair et al., 2010), GFI = 0.81 also represented a reasonable fit (Chau 1997; 
Lie et al., 2005), on the other hand RMSEA = 0.07, was well below the recommended 
criterion threshold of 0.08 (Hair et al., 2010). Put together these multiple fit criteria 
support to the model fit and further analysis of the conceptualized theoretical relationships. 
7.7 Summary 
In this chapter data screening and cleaning were performed. Preliminary assessment of the 
data including descriptive statistics has been presented. The results of reliability and 
validity tests have been presented. Several arguments concerning reliability and validity 
issues pertinent to this study have been raised and addressed. The assessment of the overall 
conceptual model has been carried out and found to be satisfactory for actual model fit in 
the regression analysis. In the next chapter data analysis and empirical findings are 
presented and discussed. 
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CHAPTER 8 
HYPOTHESES TESTS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends discussions made in the preceding chapter by performing further data 
analysis. In particular the chapter presents the results of a hierarchical regression analysis. 
It also presents tests of hypotheses developed early on in chapter four. Interaction terms 
are clearly delineated. Nonetheless the chapter presents findings from empirical tests of the 
hypotheses. 
8.2 Regression Model 
In order to test this study’s hypotheses we developed an OLS-regression model which was 
meant to assess the main effect of trust (TRUST), and interaction effects of relationship 
duration (DURAT), buyer dependence (BUYDEP), buyer transaction-specific investment 
(BUYSPEC) and buyer’s volume of purchase (PURCHVOL) on supplier’s opportunism 
(OPPORT). The rationale for our choice of Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS) as a 
regression technique is based on recommendations of Gujarati (2003). Nonetheless the 
application of OLS as a principal regression analysis technique is not uncommon in the 
extant literature as it has been extensively used to assess existing relationship between 
dependent variable and independent variables and also interaction effects (Buvik et al., 
2014; Rokkan et al., 2003; Salema 2014). Therefore the regression model is presented as 
follows: 
OPPORT     =     b0 + b1TRUST + b2BUYDEP + b3BUYSPEC + b4DURAT
+ b5$PURCHVOL + b6ACNEED + b7BUYDEP x DURAT
+ b8BUYSPEC x $PURCHVOL + ε                                 
… Equation(8.1) 
Where: 
OPPORT = Supplier opportunism; TRUST = trust; BUYDEP = buyer dependence; 
BUYSPEC = buyer transaction-specific investment; DURAT= relationship duration; and 
PURCHVOL = annual purchase volume, are independent variables: ACNEED = 
percentage of annual accommodation needs is a control variable; BUYDEP x DURAT 
and BUYSPEC x $PURCHVOL, are interaction terms; 
b0 = Constant: b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8 = regression coefficients: and ε = Error term. 
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In order to assess the effect of interaction terms in regression Equation 8.1 above we have 
taken the partial derivative of buyer specific investment (BUYSPEC) and buyer 
dependence (BUYDEP) with respect to supplier opportunism (OPPORT) in accordance 
with Rokkan et al., (2003) and Buvik et al., (2014). We first off considered the partial 
effect of the buyer asymmetrical dependence on supplier opportunism in the presence of a 
well established prior history of buyer-seller relationship. The partial derivative is 
presented in Equation 8.2 below: 
δOPPORT
δBUYDEP 
=  b2  +  b7DURAT                                                          
… (Equation 8.2) 
Secondly we considered the partial effect of asymmetrical buyer-held transaction-specific 
investment on supplier opportunism in the presence of high annual puchasing volume. The 
partial derivative is presented in Equation 8.3 below: 
δOPPORT
δBUYSPEC 
=  b3  +  b8PURCHVOL                                                 
… (Equation 8.3) 
8.3 Estimation Results 
8.3.1 Correlation Matrix 
In as far as the overall regression model in Equation 8.1 consists of two interaction terms; 
there exists a potential problem of multicollinearity (Buvik et al., 2014). Multicollinearity 
is the extent to which independent variables are highly correlated with each other –can be 
explained by other variables such that is difficult to ascertain the direct effect that a single 
independent variable has on a dependent variable owing to their interrelationships (Hair et 
al., 2010). A rule of thumb is that, correlations among independent variables of 0.90 or 
higher echo the potential problem of multicollinearity (Hair et al., 2010; Pallant, 2011). In 
this light, Hair et al., (2010) point out that multicollinearity is harmful because it suppreses 
the R
2
 that can possibly be achieved, stifles estimation of regression coefficients and 
negatively affects the statistical significance tests of regression coefficients (ibid.). 
To ensure the potential problem of multicolinearity is circumvented, extant literature 
suggests the use of tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) (Hair et al., 2010; Peng 
and Lie, 2012). In tolerance method a Pearson’s correlation coefficient for each 
independent variable is computed and then deducted from one (i.e. 1 – R2), the higher the 
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tolerance the lower is the potential for the existence of multicollinearity (Hair et al., 2010; 
Pallant, 2011). The recommended criterion threshold for tolerance is the value equals to or 
above 0.10 (Hair et al., 2010; Pallant, 2011). VIF on the other hand is the second method 
of assessing potential multicollinearity among independent variables and is the inverse of 
tolerance. The generally agreed upon criterion threshold for VIF is any values equal to or 
below 10 (Hair et al., 2010; Pallant, 2011). 
To overcome the potential problem of multicollenearity among independent variable in our 
model we mean-centered all independent variables that made up interaction terms in light 
of the research work by Rokkan et al., (2003) and Buvik et al., (2014). As Robinson and 
Schumaker (2009) point out, centering of independent variables constituting interaction 
terms enhances a more meaningful interpretation of the results. Moreover, mean-centering 
of the main independent variable and moderator variable enables the interpretation of 
regression coefficient of the focal independent variable on the dependent variable when the 
moderator variable is at its mean value (Rokkan et al., 2003) meanwhile the interpretations 
of the interaction effects do not change (ibid.). Table 8.1 below presents correlation matrix, 
descriptive statistics and collinearity diagnostics. 
Table 8.1: Correlation Matrix, Descriptives Statistics and Collinearity Diagnostics 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. OPPORT 1.0 -.37 .14 .13 -.21 -.33 .05 -.29 -.12 
2. TRUST  1.0 .10 -.29 .32 .27 .11 .03 -.12 
3. BUYDEP   1.0 -.22 .13 .10 .29 .13 -.17 
4. BUYSPEC    1.0 -.22 -.04 -.06 -.09 -.08 
5. DURAT
b 
    1.0 .62 .33 .12 -.21 
6. PURCHVOL
b 
     1.0 .22 .29 -.22 
7. ACNEED       1.0 -.02 .04 
8. BUYDEP x DURAT        1.0 -.02 
9. BUYSPEC x PURCHVOL         1.0 
Mean 2.57 5.56 .00
a 
.00
a 
.00
a
 .00
a
 51.15 .07 -.04 
Std. Deviation .97 .97 .99 .72 .56 1.66 18.03 .55 1.04 
Tolerance  .82 .82 .81 .52 .54 .79 .88 .86 
VIF  1.21 1.22 1.23 1.91 1.84 1.26 1.14 1.16 
a
Mean-centered variables 
b
Transformed variables into natural logarithm 
Furthermore we scanned the residuals for potential heteroscedasticity, no particular pattern 
seemed to have appeared (Hair et al., 2010; Buvik et al., 2014), (see Appendix 4c). 
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8.3.2 Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis deployed in this study includes (i) main effects (ii) control effect and 
(iii) interaction effects. 
The research model in this study constitutes the effects of independent variables and 
interaction terms. In this light we ran a hierarchical regression analysis using SPSS 22 in 
order to delineate the impact of interaction terms on the overall predictive power of the 
research model. As Robinson and Schumaker (2009) put it, a hierarchical regression model 
clearly delineates the interpretation of both main and interaction effects which may not be 
provided by a single regression model containing both main variables and interaction 
terms. Then in order to make a clear comparison and interpretation of the results of the 
separate regression Model 1 and Model 2 as presented in Table 8.2 below, we made use of 
F-value for each model (see Appendices 5a and 5b). 
Recall that all variables entering interaction terms were mean-centered in order to 
overcome the potential problem of multicollinearity. In this regard both VIF and Tolerance 
statistics were within the recommended criterion threshold of < 10 and > 0.10 respectively. 
In Model 1 supplier opportunism (OPPORT) was regressed on trust (TRUST), buyer 
dependence (BUYDEP), buyer transaction-specific investment (BUYSPEC), relationship 
duration (DURAT), annual purchase volume (PURCHVOL) meanwhile controlling for 
percentage of annual accommodation needs (ACNEED). As depicted in Table 8.2, Model 
1 provides adequate prediction of supplier opportunism (OPPORT) by explaining 18% of 
the variance with R
2
Adj = 0.18, significant at p < 0.05. 
Model 2 incorporates contributions of two interaction tems; buyer dependence and 
relationship duration (BUYDEP x DURAT); and buyer transaction-specific investment 
and annual purchase volume (BUYSPEC x PURCHVOL). The overall goodness of fit for 
the estimated regression Model 2 is significant with F(8,72) = 4.36, p < 0.05, and R
2
Adj = 
0.25 (see Appendix 5a and 5b), that is, Model 2 gives adequate explanation of variation in 
supplier opportunism (OPPORT) with an explanatory power of 25%. Such good fit 
indicates that our model gives an adequate description of the data set (Buvik et al., 2014). 
The inclusion of the two interaction terms in our model further enforced the model’s 
overall explanatory power by 7% which justifies the inclusion of both main effects and 
interaction terms in our model. The contribution of interaction terms is indicated in the 
significant F-change statistic where; F(2,72) = 4.414, p < 0.05 (see Appendix 5a). This 
suggests that our estimated model adequately predicts the moderating effects of 
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relationship duration and annual purchase volume on supplier opportunism. Nonetheless 
both Model 1 and Model 2 have significant F-values at p < 0.05 implying that the 
inclusion of independent variables and interaction terms significantly explains variations in 
supplier opportunism. Based on the foregoing discussions it can safely be concluded that 
our estimated model fits the data pretty well. 
Table 8.2: Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Dependent Variable –Supplier Opportunism 
(OPPORT) 
Independent Variables Hypotheses 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t-value 
CONSTANT (b0)  4.00  5.77
a 
TRUST (b1)  -0.30 -0.30 -2.73
a
 
BUYDEP (b2)  0.18 0.19 1.71
b
 
BUYSPEC (b3)  0.11 0.08 0.76
d 
DURAT (b4)  0.08 0.04 0.31
d
 
PURCHVOL (b5)  -0.18 -0.31 -2.37
a
 
ACNEED (b6)  0.01 0.09 0.80
d
 
Model 1 Fit:  R
2
 = 0.244, R
2
Adj = 0.183, F(6,74) = 3.980, p = 0.002, n = 81 
     
CONSTANT (b0)  4.16  6.22
a 
TRUST (b1) H1 (-) -0.33 -0.33 -3.13
a
 
BUYDEP (b2)  0.17 0.17 1.56
c
 
BUYSPEC (b3)  0.03 0.03 0.24
d 
DURAT (b4)  -0.03 -0.02 -0.12
d
 
PURCHVOL (b5)  -0.14 -0.24 -1.85
b 
ACNEED (b6)  0.01 0.10 0.95
d
 
BUYDEP x DURAT (b7) H2 (-) -0.41 -0.23 -2.22
b
 
BUYSPEC x PURCHVOL (b8) H3 (-) -0.18 -0.19 -1.85
b
 
Model 2 Fit: R
2
 = 0.327, R
2
Adj = 0.252, F(8,72) = 4.364, p = 0.000, R
2
-change = 0.083, F-change (2,72)         
= 4.414, p < 0.05 n = 81 
a
Significant at p < 0.01  for t-values greater than 2.33 one tail 
b
Significant at p < 0.05  for t-values greater than 1.65 one tail 
c
Significant at p < 0.10  for t-values greater than 1.28 one tail 
d
Not significant  
Nonetheless 33% of variations in the dependent variable OPPORT can be explained by 
independent variables: TRUST, BUYDEP, BUYSPEC; control variable: ACNEED and the 
interaction terms: BUYDEP x DURAT and BUYSPEC x PURCHVOL. 
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8.4 Test of Hypotheses 
By susbstituting the figures in Table 8.2 above, we can reformulate the regression equation 
as follows: 
OPPORT     =     4.16 − 0.33TRUST + 0.17BUYDEP + 0.03BUYSPEC − 0.03DURAT
− 0.14$PURCHVOL + 0.01ACNEED − 0.41BUYDEP x DURAT
− 0.18BUYSPEC x $PURCHVOL + ε                                      
… Equation(8.4) 
The regression model in Equation 8.4 demonstrates the relationship between dependent 
variable supplier opportunism (OPPORT) and (i) independent variables: trust (TRUST), 
buyer dependence (BUYDEP), buyer held transaction-specific investment (BUYSPEC), 
relationship duration (DURAT), annual purchasing volume ($PURCHVOL) (ii) control 
variable: percentage of annual accommodation needs (ACNEED) (iii) two interaction 
terms: buyer dependence and relationship duration (BUYDEP x DURAT) and asymmetric 
buyer-held transaction-specific investment and annual purchase volume (BUYSPEC x 
$PURCHVOL). 
The effect of trust (TRUST) on supplier opportunism (OPPORT) is negative and 
significant (b1 = -0.33, t = -3.13, p < 0.01, one tail). Hence hypothesis H1 is supported. On 
the other hand hypotheses H2 and H3 relate to interaction terms BUYDEP x DURAT and 
BUYSPEC x $PURCHVOL respectively. The output of the regression analysis in Table 
8.2 above indicates that both interaction terms are negative and significant, with (b7 = -
0.41, t = -2.22, p < 0.05) for H2; and (b8 = -0.18, t = 1.85, p < 0.05) for H3, thus supporting 
hypotheses H2 and H3.  
The interpretation of hypothesis H2 is that, as the relationship between tour operators and 
accommodation establishment becomes well established over time, the positive association 
between tour operators’ dependence and accommodation establishments’ opportunism is 
significantly weakened. 
Meanwhile the interpretation of hypothesis H3 is that, the positive association of tour 
operators’ unilateral transaction-specific investment on accommodation establishments’ 
opportunism is significantly reduced when tour operators’ annual purchasing volume in 
dollar value becomes substantial. The control variable in this study has no significant 
effect on supplier opportunism however it demonstrates the expected sign. Further analysis 
of the interaction terms is provided underneath. 
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8.4.1 Interpretation of Interaction Effects 
As pointed out early on, we mean-centered all independent variables that made up the 
interaction terms as recommended by Kline (2011) and Jaccard and Wan (1996) in order to 
overcome the potential problem of multicollinearity. The practice of mean-centering the 
product terms is evident in the previous research work by Buvik et al., (2014), Wang et al., 
(2013), Rokkan et al., (2003), and Buvik and Grønhaug (2000). The presence of 
multicollinearity can thus render correlations between interacting terms and their 
constituent variables inflated (Kline, 2011) leading to artificial results. Thus by mean-
centering, the main effect of a variable constituting the interaction terms is taken when the 
variable with which it interacts is at their mean level (Buvik et al., 2014; Rokkan et al., 
2003). 
8.4.1.1 BUYDEP x DURAT 
We first off, performed a partial derivative of supplier opportunism (OPPORT) with 
respect to buyer dependence (BUYDEP) based on the regression model estimated in 
Equation 8.4 above, the result of which is presented in Equation 8.5 below. 
δOPPORT
δBUYDEP 
=  0.17 −  0.41DURAT                                                           
… (Equation 8.5) 
Following the result presented in Equation 8.5 a graph depicted in Figure 8.1 was plotted. 
The graph below, demonstrates the plot of partial derivative of supplier opportunism with 
respect to buyer dependence over the range of relationship duration. The graph portrays a 
negative slope of the moderator variable suggesting that, buyer dependence (BUYDEP) 
becomes more negatively related to supplier opportunism (OPPORT) as relationship 
evolves over time. 
Recall that we expressed relationship duration as the natural logarithm of the number of 
years the relationship has lasted, which is Ln(Year). It follows that, the illustration below 
is in logarithmic scale. 
Figure 8.1: The Effect of Asymmetric Buyer Dependence on Supplier Opportunism at 
Different Levels of Relationship Duration 
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Figure 8.1 above portrays the estimated main effect of asymmetric buyer dependence on 
supplier opportunism when relationship duration is at its mean value; that is at 2.24. The 
exact value at the relationship duration’s intercept is 2.65 [i.e. mean value + 0.41]. 
Our empirical findings demonstrate that, the effect of asymmetric buyer dependence on 
supplier opportunism is non-monotonic over the range of relationship duration. This means 
that in relationships with relatively short prior history (i.e. newborn relationships) the 
increase in buyer’s dependence on the supplier enforces the latter’s opportunism. 
Specifically asymmetric buyer dependence has a positive effect on supplier opportunism in 
the relationship duration range below 2.65. This level corresponds to 14 years when the 
partial derivative of supplier opportunism with respect to asymmetrical buyer dependence 
equals zero (i.e. asymmetrical buyer dependence has no impact on supplier opportunism). 
However as the prior history of relationship between buyer and seller increases over time, 
the relationship becomes well established hence the association between buyer’s 
dependence and supplier’s opportunism becomes negative. That is the positive effect of 
buyer dependence on supplier opportunism declines to zero when relationship duration is 
14 years old, and it even becomes strongly negative when the relationship duration 
exceeds 14 years. Nonetheless this level corresponds to the upper quartile of relationship 
duration scale in our data set and signifies considerable low levels of opportunism where 
asymmetric buyer dependence is paired with relationship duration. This provides an 
empirical support for hypothesis H2. 
.40
.17
-.17
.20-.60 -.40
 OPPORT
 BUYDEP 
= 0.17 − 0.41DURAT
-.20 0
DURAT
 OPPORT/ BUYDEP
.60
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8.4.1.2 BUYSPEC x PURCHVOL 
Furthermore we performed a first partial derivative of supplier opportunism (OPPORT) 
with respect to buyer held transaction-specific investment (BUYSPEC) based on the 
regression model estimated in Equation 8.4 above, the result of which is presented in 
Equation 8.6 below: 
δOPPORT
δBUYSPEC
=  0.03 −  0.18PURCHVOL                                                        
… (Equation 8.6) 
Likewise following the result presented in Equation 8.6, the graph depicted in figure 8.2 
was plotted. The graph portrays a negative slope of the moderator variable suggesting that 
an increase in annual purchase volume in a buyer-seller relationship attenuates the positive 
effect of buyer-held transaction-specific investment on supplier opportunism. 
Figure 8.2: The Effect of Asymmetric Buyer-held Transaction-Specific Investment on 
Supplier Opportunism at Different Levels of Annual Purchase Volume 
 
Figure 8.2 above portrays the estimated main effect of asymmetric buyer-held transaction- 
specific investment on supplier opportunism when purchasing volume is at its mean value; 
that is at 12.37 in the logarithmic scale. The exact value at the purchase volume’s intercept 
is 12.53 [i.e. mean value + 0.16]. 
Specifically, Figure 8.2 above demonstrates that, for low levels of purchase volume, 
increases in buyer unilateral transaction-specific investment have a positive influence on 
.16 .32
.03
 OPPORT
 BUYSPEC 
= 0.03 − 0.18PURCHVOL
-.16 0
 OPPORT/ BUYSPEC
PURCHVOL
-.32
-.03
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supplier opportunism. However this association changes in a non-monotonic way over the 
range of purchase volume. As the level of purchase volume becomes substantial, the 
association between unilateral buyer-held transaction-specific investment and supplier 
opportunism becomes negative when purchase volume exceeds the level of 12.53. 
Put differently, for very small annual purchasing volumes, increasing buyer transaction-
specific investment increases supplier opportunism. However as the annual volume of 
purchases increases this association becomes negative. Specifically this association is 
positive for purchasing volumes below the level of 12.53 in the logarithmic scale, which 
corresponds to US$ 278,000, and turns negative for purchasing volumes exceeding this 
level. Furthermore this level corresponds to the upper quartile of the purchase volume 
scale in our data set, and it demonstrates the impotency of supplier opportunism when 
asymmetrical buyer-held transaction-specific investment intertwines with large purchasing 
volume. This reasoning supports hypothesis H3 in our model. 
8.5 Summary of Hypotheses Test 
Table 8.3: Summary of Hypotheses and Results  
Hypothesis Coefficient t-value Findings 
H1: There is a negative association between the level of 
trust and opportunism in the tour operator-accommodation 
establishment relationship. 
-0.33 -3.13
a
 Supported 
H2: The association between buyer dependence and 
supplier opportunism is significantly reduced when the 
relationship duration increases. 
-0.41 -2.22
b
 Supported 
H3: The association between buyer-held transaction-
specific investment and supplier opportunism is 
significantly lowered when the purchasing volume 
increases 
-0.18 -1.85
b
 Supported 
a
Significant at p < 0.01  for t-values greater than 2.33 one tail 
b
Significant at p < 0.05  for t-values greater than 1.65 one tail 
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8.6 Summary 
In this chapter OLS reqression technique has been utilized to derive the estimated 
regression model used in this study. Furthermore the chapter has presented the outcome of 
a hierarchical regression analysis of the estimated supplier opportunism and subsequent 
tests of hypotheses. All hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) in this study have been strongly 
supported. The next chapter presents a summary of findings and gives a thorough 
discussion in light of the relevant theoretical underpinnings. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
FUTURE DIRECTION 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the culmination of foregoing discusions in the previous chapters. It brings 
together discussions raised in the previous chapters albeit in a nutshell with regard to the 
relevant theories. The chapter further presents and gives a thorough discussion on the key 
findings of this study in light of the research questions and objectives of this study. 
Theoretical and managerial implications are also presented, not to mention the limitation 
of this study and suggestions for future directions. 
9.2 Summary of the Findings 
The main objective of this study was to identify and discuss the key antecedents of 
suppliers’ opportunistic behavior towards their buyers in the tourism industry setting. 
Nonetheless this study sought to investigate the moderating role of purchase volume and 
relationship duration with respect to supplier’s opportunism given high levels of focal 
buyer’s dependence and unilateral transaction-specific investment. It is hoped that the 
findings in this study will help policy makers and management practitioners to better 
rearrange inter-firm relationships, because in an ever-changing business environment 
relationships matter as they evolve to represent some kind of competitive advantage. 
Furthermore Table 8.1 above gives a blueprint of a hierarchical regression analysis 
however, the key findings of this study are presented in Table 8.4 above. The overall 
goodness of fit for our estimated model was good with R
2
 = 0.327, R
2
Adj = 0.252, F(8,72) = 
4.364, p = 0.000, R
2
-change = 0.083, F-change (2,72) = 4.414, p < 0.05 n = 81. 
Three hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) were formulated in this study and all have been strongly 
supported as pointed out early on. All the three hypotheses conformed to relevant 
theoretical reasoning and had expected signs. The control variable, percentage of annual 
accommodation needs was not significant however it had the expected sign as well. All the 
constructs entering interaction terms had expected signs and were significant i.e BUYDEP 
significant at p < 0.10; with b2 = 0.17 and t =1.56, PURCHVOL significant at p < 0.05; 
with b5 = -0.14 and t =1.85 with an exception of DURAT and BUYSPEC which were not 
significant. The respective signs indicate that our findings conform to the existing 
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empirical work and relevant theories that inform this study which include TCA, RCT and 
RDT. 
Specifically, the findings in this study suggest that, asymmetrical dependence in an 
exchange relationship renders a weaker party vulnerable to opportunistic behaviors from 
their counterpart, this association is found to be positive and significant. Notwithstanding 
the asymmetrical tour operators’ dependence on accommodation establishments, the 
presence of a well established relationship between tour operators and ccommodation 
establishments weakens the latter’s opportunism. This is due to the fact that a long prior 
history of relationship between tour operators and accommodation establishments 
enhances social bonds and shared values that govern the way each transaction is carried 
out. Therefore this association was found to be negative and significant. On the other hand, 
trust was found to negatively influence accommodation establishmets’ opportunism 
towards tour operators. Meanwhile unilateral transaction-specific investment creates value 
claiming problems and exposes tour operators to opportunistic exploitation by the 
accommodation establishments, however the annual purchase volume represents a stake 
that acts a counterpower towards the latter’s opportunism, and this association was found 
to be negative and significant. 
9.3 Discussions and Implications 
9.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
The primary focus of this thesis centered on drawing empirical evidence from the buyer-
seller relationship in the service industry in light of TCA, RDT and RCT. Specifically, we 
zeroed in on assessing the interplay beween these theories in an attempt to provide a better 
understanding and empirical test of the antecedents of supplier opportunism in the 
Tanzania’s tourism industry. In particular this discussion sets off by first bringing into 
perspective the role interpersonal and interorganizational trust plays in attenuating 
opportunistic exploitation in the tour operator-accommodation establishment relationship. 
Then the discussion goes on to introducing the core results of the interaction terms 
accruing from RCT, RDT and TCA. Specifically we bring to light these three theories in a 
nutshell and provide empirical test of hypotheses we developed in the first place, taking 
into consideration these theoretical underpinnings. 
Extant literature informs that as the result of inherent volatility in the availability of critical 
resources, firms move from discrete transactions –infested with adversarial exploitations to 
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more relational exchanges (Dwyer et al., 1987), where exchange partners stand a chance of 
benefiting from shared goals and mutual complementarities. Accordingly, relational 
exhanges promote relational norms and shared values (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) that 
further foster the development of trust in an exchange relationship. Nonetheless, as 
exchange relationship evolves over time, exchange partners learn more about each other, 
developing a set of shared norms, values and trust in the process. Such business trust 
safeguards against opportunistic exploitation (Buvik et al., 2014) of either counterpart in 
the exchange relationship. 
The finding in this thesis is consistent with the predictions of TCA and RCT where trust 
was found to significantly dissipate opportunistic tendencies of accommodation 
establishments towards tour operators. Specifically trust was negatively related to 
accommodation establishments’ opportunism at b1 = -0.33, t = -3.13, p < 0.01. This finding 
corroborates the work done by Morgan and Hunt (1994; 1997); Yenidogan et al., (2011); 
and Cavusgil, Deligonul and Zhang, (2004), among others. 
As pointed out early on, asymmetrical dependence creates a room for opportunistic 
manipulation by the party who perceives himself to be in a stronger position in an 
exchange relationship. Nonetheless, extant literature on RDT posits that when one party 
depends on another party in an exchange relationship for critical resources, such 
dependence empowers the less dependent party (Gaski, 1984; Dwyer et al., 1987; Bucklin 
and Sengupta, 1993; Ganesan, 1994). This disparity in power structures renders exchange 
relationships susceptible to opportunistic expropriation (Buvik and Reve, 2002), less stable 
and infested with conflicts (Rokkan and Haugland, 2002; Dwyer et al., 1987). More 
importantly, power asymmetry results into dissatisfaction on the weaker party in an 
exchange relationship (Anderson and Narus, 1984). Not to mention the fact that exchange 
conflicts increase transaction costs and negatively affect relationship continuity. 
Specifically this study found out that tour operators invariably depend on accommodation 
establishments for the constant supply of bednights. Such dependence ensues from the fact 
that, the available bednights secured from a specific supplier cannot be easily replaced by 
other suppliers taking into consideration cost implications, quality of services and location 
advantage. As bednights availability represents the critical resource the tour operators 
require to survive and achieve their business goals, such resource is not within the realm of 
tour operators’ ownership. As such they revert to depending on accommodation 
establishments. This line of reasoning is consistent with Emerson (1962)’s argument that 
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an exchange party relies on another on the basis of key resources (i.e. bednights) that the 
other party in the exchange relationship is endowed with (which in fact empowers the 
latter) which the other party requires to achieve its goals and the extent to which such 
resources can be secured from alternative avenues. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) put it, 
“it is uncertainty and dependence that compel organizations to proactively manage their 
task environment to ensure a constant flow of resources.” 
The finding reveals that most accommodation establishments are located in strategic 
tourist attraction areas. This strategic positioning gives them an edge over the tour 
operators because year in year out the latter will have to take their clients to these 
accommodation establishments any way. And as long as accommodation establishments 
consist of a chain of properties replacing them with other suppliers will cost the tour 
operators significant amount of money and time one way or the other. The finding in this 
thesis is consistent with TCA and RDT predictions in that, asymmetrical dependence 
creates power on the party who is endowed with critical resources which the other needs to 
accomplish its business mission. Such power may be used to extract quasi-rent at the 
expense of dependent exchange partner. The main effect of buyer dependence was found 
to be positively associated with accommodation establishments opportunism and was 
significant at b2 = 0.17, t = 1.56, p < 0.10. Notwithstanding this, no hypothesis was 
developed regarding this main effect. 
Notwithstanding this asymmetrical dependence of tour opeartors on accommodation 
establishments, relational contracting theory informs that, as the buyer-supplier 
relationship develops over time, exchange partners are bound to identify with one another, 
sinking their differences and look out for each other. Such spirit of togetherness emanates 
from relational norms and shared values (Dwyer et al., 1987) that emerge in the course of 
repeated business encounters and which are the product of the past (Rokkan et al., 2003). 
As Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) point out, prior history of business encounters enables 
exchange parties to evaluate each other’s potentialities and develop necessary relationship 
that promotes their business interest; and consequently, the norms that govern interfirm 
transactions and safeguard against opportunistic expropriation by exchange partners. 
While asymmetrical resource dependence gives rise to power (Gaski, 1984; Bucklin and 
Sengupta, 1993; Buvik and Reve, 2002), a well established relationship subsumes the 
power disparity in an exchange relationship thus dissipating opportunistic tendencies of 
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exchange parties. The finding in this work confirms this line of argument. As the duration 
of relationship between tour operators and accommodation establishments increases, the 
positive association between the former’s asymmetrical dependence and the latter’s 
opportunism dissolves significantly at, b7 = -0.41, t = -2.22, p < 0.05; which means that for 
every unit increase in relationship duration the association between asymmetrical tour 
operators dependence and accommodation establishments opportunism wanes away by 
0.41. Specifically, this association moves in a non-monotonic fashion along the range of 
relationship duration where it is strong and positive in newly established relationships 
(Deeds and Hill, 1999), because of immature relational norms (Buvik and Burki, 2010). 
However as the prior history of relationship increases, relational norms take effect and 
safeguard against accommodation establishment’s opportunism. Put differently increased 
dependence in a well established relationship actually lowers opportunism due to shared 
experience and informal practices that emerge over time (Buvik et al., 2014; Wang et al., 
2013). This empirical finding is consistent with work by Buvik and Haugland (2005) 
which found out that relationship duration is of paramount importance for a vulnerable 
exchange party who faces asymmetrical dependence, and Deeds and Hill (1999) who 
found out that relationship duration is positively associated with opportunism and then 
becomes negatively associated with opportunism over time. 
On the other hand, transaction-specific investments are known to play a pivotal role in 
marketing relationships. This is due to their potential for value creation by bonding the 
exchange parties together; and value claiming problems (Ghosh and John, 1999) by 
exposing the focal investor to opportunistic expropriation by the receiver (Rokkan et al., 
2003). The bonding effect accrues from the value specific investments create in an 
exchange relationship (Ghosh and John, 1999; Rokkan et al., 2003), this kind of value 
could be; rationalized business routines and processes that save time between exchange 
parties hence reduce transaction costs. 
Value proposition occurs where benefits accruing from relationship specific investments 
are greater than the cost of redeploying such investments elsewhere. Notwithstanding this 
however, Ghosh and John (1999) argue that specific investments create value claiming 
problems. This proposition is closely related to Rokkan et al., (2003)’s argument that 
specific investments may lead to exploitation of an exchange partner by its counterpart. 
Since the nature of these assets is so unique that redeploying them in alternative uses 
(Williamson 1985) is not at the disposal of the focal investor, the receiver is bound to 
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exploit such situation by extracting quasi-rents from such unilateral investments (Buvik 
and Reve, 200; Rokkan et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2013). 
The finding in our work is consistent with predictions in the extant literature. Tour 
operators’ unilateral transaction-specific investment has been found to have a positive 
association with accommodation establishments’ opportunism. Specifically we found out 
that, tour operators’ adaptations to specific order entry routines and billing system; 
investment in time and resources directed towards quality assurance initiatives; investment 
in information technology that rationalizes interactions between the former and their 
suppliers, render the former susceptible to opportunistic expropriation (Rokkan et al., 
2003) by the latter due to lock-in effect of such lopsided investments. Coupled with the 
nature of service industry that promises are the essence of exchange relationship where the 
product is experience (Ng, 2007), there exist potential risks of quality shirking, 
renegotiation and price manipulation on the part of accommodation establishments. 
However asymmetrical transaction-specific investments promote receiver’s opportunism 
depending on circumstances surrounding an exchange relationship. In this regard we 
hypothesized that in the presence of large annual purchasing volume from tour operators 
the positive association of the unilateral transaction-specific investment and 
accommodation establishment’s opportunism is significantly lowered. This is because the 
large purchasing volume represents large stakes (Buvik and Haugland, 2005; Cai et al., 
2010), that accommodation establishments cannot afford to lose as to them it represents a 
huge sale of available bednights. In this regard we found out that, large tour operators who 
have invested in transaction-specific investments experience low opportunism from 
accommodation establishments than do small tour operators because the latter lack the 
economic efficacy that is embedded in large annual purchasing volume. 
The large purchasing volume acts as a counterpower against accommodation 
establishments’ opportunistic inclinations thus shifting power structure/bargaining power 
in favor of the tour operators (Buvik and Haugland, 2005), thereby creating 
interdependence between tour operators and accommodation establishments (Cai et al., 
2010). 
The findings in this study support predictions in TCA and RDT. That is for firms to thrive 
through volatile business environment fraught with cut-throat competition, there needs to 
be a reliable flow of input and output. However to achieve this objective firms seek 
resources from other organization as themselves are not self-sufficient in their own right 
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(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Emerson 1962), in so doing they invariably have to adapt 
their processes in order to secure such scarce and out of reach resources. In this study the 
main effect of annual purchase volume was found to be negative and significant meaning 
that big tour operators represent strategic customers (Kraljik, 1983) to accommodation 
establishments and thus create a kind of dependence on the part of the latter (Ramayah, 
Lee and In, 2011; Cai et al., 2010), which transfers bargaining power to the former (Buvik 
and Reve, 2002) and consequently constrains opportunistic behavior (Heide, 1994) of 
accommodation establishments. 
Thus opportunistic exploitation arising from asymmetrical transaction-specific investment 
is contingent upon the distribution of power structures between accommodation 
establishments and tour operators. Put differently in relationships characterized with low 
bargaining power by tour operators , asymmetric transaction-specific investments enforce 
opportunism on the part of accommodation establishments because such circumstance 
dictates so as it enables the latter to extract extra payoffs at the expense of the former 
(Rokkan et al., 2003). We found out that the effect of asymmetric transaction-specific 
investment on opportunism moved in a non-monotonic fashion along the range of 
purchasing volume; suggesting that large stakes strongly dissipate opportunistic behavior 
of the accommodation establishments due to mutuality in dependence (Heide, 1994). 
Thus, this study contributes to the understanding that, supplier inclination to opportunistic 
expropriation of quasi-rent ensuing from buyer asymmetric dependence and asymmetric 
buyer transaction-specific investment is contingent upon the level of prior history of 
relationship and bargaining power (large stakes) on the part of the buyer. At high levels of 
purchasing volume (high buyer bargaining power), and in a well established relationship, 
supplier opportunistic exploitations tend to dissipate. 
9.3.2 Managerial Implications 
The pre-requisite for any buyer-seller relationships is trust and fulfilling the obligations 
between the exchange partners, and because of the interdependence nature of organizations 
effective co-ordination is a vital attribute in a procurement setting (Buvik and Grønhaug, 
2000), with many organizations focusing on long term relationships, commitment and trust 
(Izquierdo and Cillian, 2004). In fact there has been a paradigm shift from transaction-
oriented marketing towards relationship oriented marketing, advocating close and long-
term relations that revolve around high levels of co-operation to attain mutual satisfaction 
and benefits (Izquierdo and Cillian, 2004). However, in some scenarios, some exchange 
  
85 
partners might be tempted to breach the agreements due to extra potential profits at the 
expense of others, leading to strenuous relationships due to mistrust arising from the 
opportunistic behavior. Such relationships may lead to conflicts, dissatisfaction, low 
channel performance and furthermore relationship discontinuation (Glavee-Geo, 2012). 
The main implication for managerial decision making for this study is the identification of 
dimensions in which interfirm relationships can be based on. The managers should ensure 
existing relationships be based on trust, which is time-based, as a foundation of buyer-
supplier relationship. Moreover, the relationship duration is a vital antecedent to 
organizational performance in exchange relationships (Burki and Buvik, 2010) with trust 
and commitment cementing the relationships. 
The managers of tour companies can therefore align the dimensions of their exchange 
relationships with a long-term perspective in the initial stages of their relationships in order 
to combat opportunistic behavior by exchange partners through achieving equitable and 
satisfactory relationships to the suppliers in situations of high interdependence, in order to 
enhance co-operation and co-ordination and also give room for productive conflict 
resolutions in case misunderstandings arise (Izquierdo and Cillian, 2004). 
According to the findings of this study, most transactions are conducted through 
gentlemen’s agreements, and although this is done to cement the trust between partners, it 
comes with a trade-off of exposing tour operators to lawful opportunism where parties 
break informal agreements of a relational contract (Niesten and Jolink, 2011), therefore the 
managers should review their governance mechanisms when dealing with different 
suppliers rather than putting all accommodation suppliers in one basket. For most the 
short-term duration relationships, the managers will be better off adhering to other 
governance mechanisms like hybrid governance that will safeguard them from lawful 
opportunism. Therefore it is a vital element for tour operators to understand the different 
perceptions of all of their suppliers’ relationships before deciding on any agreements and 
cohesive approaches. 
From a managerial point of view, deploying specific assets in an exchange relationship 
where suppliers have power is risky; therefore comprehensive mechanisms for 
safeguarding the specific assets invested must be set in place at the initial stages of 
exchange relationships in order to avoid room for opportunistic behaviors by suppliers of 
accommodation services. This could be achieved through marketing intelligence of all 
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potential suppliers in order to get the required information about their trade commitments, 
negotiations and contractual traditions (Buvik and Reve, 2002). 
Furthermore, the management of the tour companies could curb the problem of 
dependence through structuring their exchange relationships by establishing proper formal 
and semi-formal governance structures which will further reduce uncertainty (Buvik and 
Reve, 2002), for instance through contracting, joint ventures or even complete mergers 
(Heide, 1994), therefore creating the relevant negotiated environments in the channel 
relationships. 
Therefore the managerial implications of this study centeres on dissipating channel 
opportunism; conducted either through selection of the right suppliers, monitoring the 
suppliers to reduce information asymmetry, and also through incentives schemes, for 
instance giving priority of purchase volume to the strategic supplier (in the long run this 
can lead to relative power by a strategic buyer toward the supplier ) and through the 
socialization process that aims to build trust, commitment and co-ordination (Wathne and 
Heide, 2000). 
9.4 Limitation of the Study 
According to this study, the number of sample size collected is 81. This is a small data set 
considering factor analysis in mind that advocates for concrete sample sizes, which results 
to lower factor loadings due to small standard errors (MacCallum et al., 1999). Most extant 
literature suggests a sample size of at least 100 for adequate factor analysis, to avoid 
exposure to non-convergent and improper analysis, depending on communality and over 
determination (MacCallum et al., 1999). 
The focal point of the study is the exchange relationship between tour operators and 
accommodation establishments in the Tanzania’s tourism industry, considering 
relationship duration, dependence, buyer specific investment, trust and purchase volume as 
variables that affect opportunism. The findings in the antecedents to opportunism 
therefore, cannot be generalized in other industries’ exchange relations because they 
focused on a single industry analysis. Therefore the study provides a high degree of 
internal validity, with a trade-off to external validity, making it hard to generalize the 
findings in other industries. Moreover, this study is based on cross-sectional design with 
data collected at one point in time, thus made it impossible to investigate dynamism in the 
buyer-supplier relationships such as the effect of seasonal changes. 
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9.5 Future Directions 
This study has examined impact of buyer dependence on supplier; it leaves a door open for 
further studies to examine bilateral dependence by studying dyadic relationship between 
tour operators and accommodation establishments. The bilateral dependence could give an 
explanation on the distribution of power between focal buyer and supplier and thus giving 
a better understanding of factors that promote and deter opportunistic behavior of a trading 
partner. 
In relation to the study, further research could be done with regard to increasing the sample 
size for more accuracy and reliability of the data in terms of advocating smaller standard 
errors. Further research can be conducted on the exchange relationships across different 
actors in the Tanzania’s tourism supply chain, for instance the airlines and tour operators, 
accommodation facilities and travel agents, to bring the authenticity and clarity of the 
existing exchange relations among actors in the tourism supply chain. 
Further research could be conducted focusing on both sides of the buyer-supplier dyad by 
simultaneously collecting data also from the accommodation establishments and 
considering the aspects of opportunism from the supplier side to see either the effect of 
divergence or convergence in the buyer-seller dyad. Moreover, the catchment area of the 
study holds room for improvement, therefore further research can consider other tour 
operators and accommodation establishments from the other 23 regions of Tanzania that 
were not visited. 
Finally, buyer-seller relationships in the Tanzania’s tourism industry are dynamic and 
evolving over time, making it a long lasting phenomenon. The study has employed cross-
sectional design, which assesses the industry in a snapshot, therefore a room for 
improvement exists over time by the application of longitudinal research design because 
cross-sectional study means the hypotheses are only valid for a specific point in time, but 
longitudinal study will show the continuity trend and explain the causal processes of the 
exchange relationships between the tour operators and accommodation establishments in 
the Tanzania’s tourism industry. 
Furthermore, a longitudinal study, through research in both high and low seasons, will 
capture the aspect of seasonality and how it affects opportunism by comparing the means 
of the two seasons, because the study did not focus on seasonality as a variable affecting 
opportunism in the model.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
Dear Respondent, 
RE: SURVEY ON ANTECEDENTS TO OPPORTUNISM: THE CASE OF TOUR 
OPERATORS AND ACCOMMODATION ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE 
TANZANIA’S TOURISM INDUSTRY 
We are Master’s students under the supervision of Professor Arnt Buvik, at Molde 
University College, a specialized University in Logistics, Molde Norway. We are currently 
conducting a survey on the subject matter above for our master’s degree thesis. The main 
objective is to study buyer-seller relationships within the tourism industry in Tanzania. 
The Tanzania’s tourism industry is very important because it is one of the major sources of 
foreign exchange for the economy, provides direct and indirect employment opportunities 
and boosts economic growth in other sectors such as agriculture, transport and 
communication. The result of this survey will foster a better understanding of the key 
factors that need to be considered in the formulation of policies for the industry apart from 
the contributions it will make to the academic literature. The output of this survey will be a 
written thesis for academic purposes as well as an executive summary of findings and 
implications which may be provided to you upon your request. 
This survey involves only a small sample of tour operators in Arusha and Dar Es Salaam 
regions, hence your response is extremely important. Kindly take a few moments to 
complete the questionnaire below by answering all questions accurately reflecting the real 
situation regarding your relationship with your major supplier of accommodation services. 
Information collected in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and no individual 
respondent will be identified as responses to each question will be aggregated to aid in the 
final analysis of the information provided in this questionnaire and it is therefore not 
possible to attribute information given in the survey to individual respondents. 
Thank you in advance for taking time to respond to the questionnaire. Your support in this 
study is highly appreciated. 
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Sincerely, 
Benjamin Mosses Sakita     Emmanuel Kafti Mawrides 
Molde University College     Molde University College 
P.O. Box 2110, 6402 Molde     P.O. Box 2110, 6402 Molde 
Norway       Norway 
+255713440388; +4745523806    +4740991076 
benjamin.m.sakita@stud.himolde.no          emmanuel.k.mawrides@stud.himolde.no 
Professor Arnt Buvik (Supervisor) 
Molde University College 
P.O. Box 2110, 6402 Molde 
Norway 
Arnt.buvik@himolde.no 
 
A: Background information to the company 
1. Company name                                                                                                   
2. Number of employees both full time and part time                                             
3. Choose one of your most important suppliers of accommodation services:  
Name                                                                                         
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B: Based on the supplier you have identified above please circle the number that 
best represents your view regarding the following statements  
1. This supplier sometimes makes false 
promises regarding the availability of 
rooms by issuing service voucher 
beyond its actual capacity of bednights 
2. This supplier sometimes disguises its 
efforts to improve on its service standard  
3. Occasionaly, this supplier is unwilling to 
accept responsibilities regarding waiving 
cancellations of our bookings  
4. Sometimes this supplier expects us to pay 
for more than our fair share of the costs  
5. This supplier occasionally makes false 
accusation regarding failure to check in 
our clients  
6. Sometimes this supplier fails to provide 
proper notification in time regarding last 
minute outbooking of our clients to 
alternative accommodation  
7. This supplier sometimes uses unexpected 
events to extract extra payment from our 
company 
8. Occasionally as the result of overbooking 
situation this supplier outbooks our 
clients to another accommodation 
facility without upgrading it as stated in 
our formal and informal agreements 
Strongly disagree               Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
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C: Please circle the number that best represents your view regarding the following 
statements with respect to your most important supplier 
 
1. When an unexpected event occurs, this 
supplier always adjusts prior agreements 
instead of  forcing our company to 
comply with provisions in the old 
agreement 
2. Our company frequently experiences that 
this supplier makes necessary 
adaptations to handle unfavourable 
events in our relationship 
3. This supplier is very flexible when  there 
is required changes in reservation 
cancellation 
4. This supplier is very flexible in waiving 
“beyond release period” penalty fee 
Strongly disagree               Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
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D: Please circle the number that best represents your view regarding the following 
statements with respect to your most important supplier 
 
1. This supplier considers our well-being 
when making important decisions on 
block allocation 
2. This supplier fulfils promises it makes to 
our company regarding bookings and 
reservations  
3. We trust that this supplier  follows 
guidelines stated in our formal 
agreements 
4. The conflicts resolution with this supplier 
extends to agreements 
5. This supplier is a friend because of his 
truthfulness 
6. I trust in this supplier that his future 
decisions and actions will not adversely 
affect my company 
7. This supplier has high levels of integrity 
and honesty with regard to my 
company’s business dealings  
8. This supplier always keeps the promises 
it makes to our company 
9. This supplier considers our welfare when 
making important decisions such as 
extension of relaese period 
Strongly disagree               Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
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Your company may have made investments in time, energy, and/or money specifically to 
accommodate this supplier and its services. These investments would be lost if your 
company switched to another supplier 
E: Please circle the number that best represents your view regarding the following 
statements with respect to your most important supplier 
 
1. In order to secure allotment of rooms 
from this supplier, our company places 
substantial downpayment in advance 
2. Our company has developed specialized 
order entry routines adapted to  this 
supplier 
3. We have adapted our billing routines to 
the specific order entry system of this 
supplier 
4. Our company has invested in a quality 
assurance program required by  this 
supplier to ensure that it meets our 
required service standards 
5. Our company has made significant 
investment in information technology 
dedicated to the interactions with this 
supplier 
6. If our company switched to a competitor 
of this supplier we would lose a 
significant part of invenstment that we 
have made for adapting to this supplier 
Strongly disagree               Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
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Your supplier may have made investments in time, energy, and/or money specifically to 
accommodate your company. These investments would be lost if your company switched 
to another supplier 
F: Please circle the number that best represents your view regarding the following 
statements with respect to your most important supplier 
 
1. Our supplier has made substantial 
investments in facilities, supplies, and 
services to cater for our bed night 
requirements 
2. Our supplier has committed a lot of time 
and resources to meeting our 
requirements regarding routines for 
service standard control 
3. Our supplier has made significant 
investments in extending 
accommodation capacity to 
accommodate our bed-night 
reguirements 
4. Our supplier has made substantial 
investments in training its staff to meet 
service requirements from our company 
5. Our supplier has spent a lot of time and 
resources to coordinate the operations 
with our company 
6. Our supplier has to a great extent 
adjusted booking effectuation and 
reservation confirmation from our 
company 
Strongly disagree               Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
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7. If our company switched to a competitor, 
this supplier will lose a lot of investment 
they have made in marketing their 
services to our company 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
G: Please circle the number that best represents your view regarding the following 
statements with respect to your most important supplier 
 
1. There are many competitive suppliers 
offering similar accommodation 
services as this supplier 
2. Our company is very dependent on this 
supplier because of its high level of 
service standard  
3. Our company is very dependent on this 
supplier due to its high availability of 
bednights 
4. It would be very difficult to replace 
bednights our company secures from 
this supplier 
5. This supplier offers our company very 
favourable rates 
6. It will cost us significant amount of 
money and time if the relationship with 
this supplier should be terminated and 
replaced with other suppliers 
Strongly disagree               Strongly agree 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
 
 
1        2         3         4         5         6        7 
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H: Kindly complete the following statements regarding your most important 
supplier by filling in the blank spaces or ticking where appropriate 
1. How long have you been doing business with this supplier?                             years 
2. How much in terms of monetary value did your company buy from this supplier 
during the last year                        USD $ 
3. What percentage (0% - 100%) of your company’s total annual accommodation 
service needs is provided by this suplier?                    % 
4. How many tourists did your company receive during the last year?                  tourists 
5. How many tourists did your company trade with this supplier during the last 
year?               tourists 
6. What sales/turnover did your company have during the last year? 
                                US $ 
7. Which type of contract does your company have with this supplier? (a) Allotment 
contract (b) Rack rate (Spot) contract (c) Others 
( mention)                                                                                   
8. Are you a member of any tourism association? Yes             No            
If Yes; Organization name                                                                 
9. What Star does your supplier possess? (a) 5-star (b) 4-star (c) 3-star (d) 2-star  
(e)1-star (f) zero-star 
10. What is the nationality of your major supplier? (a) Tanzanian (b) Foreigner (c) Joint 
(both native and foreign owners) 
11. Kindly complete the table below by indicating purchasing patterns of your company 
from this supplier according to low and high seasons in percentage. Your best 
estimate is just as good 
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 Percentage of orders/purchases (%) from this supplier 
High Season  
Low Season  
 
Thank You 
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Appendix 2 : Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Normality (n=81) 
 
  
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
OPPORT1 1 5 2.31 1.19 0.789 0.267 0.025 0.529
OPPORT2 1 5 2.75 1.328 0.174 0.267 -1.064 0.529
OPPORT3 1 5 2.81 1.352 0.253 0.267 -1.088 0.529
OPPORT4 1 5 2.59 1.33 0.269 0.267 -1.066 0.529
OPPORT5 1 5 2.57 1.36 0.496 0.267 -0.913 0.529
OPPORT6 1 6 3.04 1.346 0.184 0.267 -0.969 0.529
OPPORT7 1 5 2.42 1.499 0.547 0.267 -1.161 0.529
OPPORT8 1 6 2.69 1.429 0.328 0.267 -0.978 0.529
TRUST1 1 7 5.26 1.233 -0.759 0.267 0.95 0.529
TRUST2 3 7 5.64 1.076 -0.286 0.267 -0.436 0.529
TRUST3 3 7 5.89 1.037 -0.463 0.267 -0.426 0.529
TRUST4 1 7 5.42 1.234 -0.814 0.267 1.22 0.529
TRUST5 2 7 5.12 1.373 -0.228 0.267 -0.593 0.529
TRUST6 1 7 5.47 1.324 -0.794 0.267 0.67 0.529
TRUST7 3 7 5.79 1.033 -0.47 0.267 -0.324 0.529
TRUST8 2 7 4.77 1.66 0.149 0.267 -1.439 0.529
TRUST9 2 7 5.14 1.358 -0.16 0.267 -0.858 0.529
BUYSPEC1 1 7 4.4 1.787 -0.619 0.267 -0.441 0.529
BUYSPEC2 1 5 1.53 0.937 1.921 0.267 3.091 0.529
BUYSPEC3 1 7 1.56 1.061 2.525 0.267 8.192 0.529
BUYSPEC4 1 6 1.51 0.989 2.248 0.267 5.361 0.529
BUYSPEC5 1 4 1.37 0.766 1.993 0.267 2.944 0.529
BUYSPEC6 1 4 1.33 0.725 2.022 0.267 2.848 0.529
BUYDEP1 1 7 4.44 1.597 -0.501 0.267 -0.244 0.529
BUYDEP2 1 7 4.51 1.185 -0.663 0.267 0.807 0.529
BUYDEP3 2 7 4.83 0.985 -0.931 0.267 1.269 0.529
BUYDEP4 1 7 4.48 1.566 -0.485 0.267 -0.102 0.529
BUYDEP5 2 7 5.49 1.295 -0.605 0.267 -0.362 0.529
BUYDEP6 2 7 4.57 1.414 0.049 0.267 -0.728 0.529
Skewness Kurtosis
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Appendix 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model Fit (n=81) 
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Appendix 4 (a): Residual Distribution Chart 
 
Appendix 4 (b): Normal Probability Plot for Normality Assessment 
 
  
117 
Appendix 4 (c): Graphical Portrayal of Heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
Appendix 5(a): Research’s Model Summary 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .494
a
 .244 .183 .87974 .244 3.980 6 74 .002 
2 .571
b
 .327 .252 .84176 .083 4.414 2 72 .016 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ACNEED, BUYSPEC, PURCHVOL, BUYDEP, TRUST, DURAT 
b. Predictors: (Constant), ACNEED, BUYSPEC, PURCHVOL, BUYDEP, TRUST, DURAT, 
BUYDEPxDURAT, BUYSPECxPURCHVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: OPPORT 
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Appendix 5(b): Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
ANOVA
c
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 18.480 6 3.080 3.980 .002
a
 
Residual 57.271 74 .774   
Total 75.752 80    
2 Regression 24.736 8 3.092 4.364 .000
b
 
Residual 51.016 72 .709   
Total 75.752 80    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ACNEED, BUYSPEC, PURCHVOL, BUYDEP, TRUST, DURAT 
b. Predictors: (Constant), ACNEED, BUYSPEC, PURCHVOL, BUYDEP, TRUST, DURAT, 
BUYDEPxDURAT, BUYSPECxPURCHVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: OPPORT 
 
Appendix 6: Bivariate Correlation Coefficients (n=81) 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. OPPORT 1
2. TRUST -.367** 1
3. BUYDEP 0.135 0.102 1
4. BUYSPEC 0.127 -.288** -.220* 1
5. DURAT -0.21 .324** 0.133 -0.216 1
6. PURCHVOL -.329** .268* 0.103 -0.037 .616** 1
7. ACNEED 0.049 0.114 .290** -0.064 .326** 0.218
8. BUYDEP x DURAT -0.108 .288** .701** -.292** .786** .528** .393** 1
9. BUYSPEC x PURCHVOL 0.023 -.225* -0.209 .964** -0.073 0.205 0.000 -0.176 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
